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ABSTRACT
In the competitive and fast-paced industry of residential real estate, digital marketing
strategies must effectively meet the information needs and demands of the industry’s three key
stakeholders: buyers, sellers, and agents. Digital house hunting is the predominant search
strategy for prospective homebuyers who scour the Internet looking for homes to purchase.
Property sellers and real estate professionals, whose shared end-goal is to transact a successful
sale, must discern which digital marketing choices are optimal for marketing for-sale properties
online in the digital channels where buyers are searching.
A 2008 settlement agreement between the Department of Justice and the National
Association of Realtors over concerns of anticompetitive policies relating to virtual office
websites (VOWs) led to a shift in responsibility from the agent to the seller regarding which
online marketing options will be associated with the online property listings. Real estate agents
allocate time and resources to market properties on behalf of sellers, and need strategies that
cater to buyers’ search preferences and sellers’ online marketing prerogatives while remaining
effective and cost-efficient.
Previous empirical studies using MLS data have considered the effects of seller
marketing choices of real estate platforms and types of agents (i.e. full-service, flat-fee, etc.) as
well as the impacts of a variety of agent marketing efforts on the market outcomes of sales price,
time on the market, and the probability of sale.
This research extends prior work by providing a quantitative analysis of the effects digital
marketing choices of sellers (allowing “blogging” or third-party commentary) and digital
v

marketing efforts of the agents (using a virtual tour) have on market outcomes. This analysis also
includes a novel inquiry into what, if any, measurable effects the various platforms chosen for
the virtual tours have on market outcomes.

vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
Digital technology has “shaken marketing at its core” with almost all of current
marketing subsumed into some form of digital marketing across most businesses and industries
(Wind & Mahajan, 2001). The widespread availability of the Internet and its continued user
growth over the past few decades have influenced consumer behavior in communication
techniques, information acquisition, and search and purchase behaviors (Kannan & Li, 2017).
One of the most ubiquitous effects of the “digital revolution” is in the way innovations and
developments in digital, social media, and mobile marketing (DSMM)1 disrupt and “shake up”
industries (Ganugly, Das & Farr, 2017) by creating new experiences that allow buyer and
marketer behaviors that had not been previously possible (Lamberton & Stephen, 2016). As
digital environments have evolved, they have influenced the buyer’s search behavior. In
residential real estate, a competitive and fast-paced industry highly dependent on gathering and
distributing property details in order to generate sales, digitizing the home selling/buying process
has been positively transformative (Cherif & Grant, 2014), and has affected how sellers and the
real estate agents2 who represent them market residential properties.
Digital marketing encompasses the use of diverse digital technologies and techniques
available to promote and market brands or products (Niveditta & Padmavathy, 2017). Batra and
Keller (2016) credit the diversity of these media choices as a “blessing to marketers” who can

1

Lamberton and Stephen (2016) use the umbrella term Digital, Social Media, and Mobile Marketing (DSMM) to denote their thematic analysis of
publications from both research and practice between 2000-2015 and to chronicle the “digital transformation of marketing.”
The designation “real estate agents” used in this study does not imply specific licensing; it follows the example of using the terminology from
several studies (Ford, Rutherford, & Yavas, 2005; Acharya, Kagan, & Zimmerman, 2010).
2
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then use them to help consumers move more quickly along their path to purchase. Online
searching, in general, shortens the stages of the consumer journey—specifically in the
consideration (e.g. search) and evaluation stages—and reduces search costs (Ratchford, Lee, &
Taldukar, 2003; Ratchford, Lee, & Taldukar, 2007). The nature of the housing market is such
that the “products,” the for-sale homes, are not homogenous, and thus, the search process can be
costly for both buyers and sellers as they seek optimal matches for their preferences and
properties (Allen, Dare & Li, 2018; Ford, Rutherford, & Yavas, 2005). Buyers incur search costs
(e.g. time spent collecting information and visiting properties), and sellers incur holding costs
while waiting for a buyer (Richardson & Zumpano, 2012). Internet usage during the
homebuyer’s journey has been determined to reduce search costs while it simultaneously
increases buyer search intensity (Zumpano, Johnson, & Anderson, 2003; Ford et al., 2005;
Richardson & Zumpano, 2012).
Residential properties are generally acknowledged to be “high-ticket, high-risk” products
requiring substantial information prior to purchase; thus, physical proximity (in the traditional
environment) is usually needed in at least one stage of the consumer’s buying journey for these
higher risk transactions (Varadarajan & Yadav, 2002). Nevertheless, the digital environment
provides prospective buyers the opportunity to pre-view homes helping them condense the set of
homes under consideration to a more reasonable and manageable number (Varadarajan & Yadav,
2002). With the increase in search ease, decrease in search costs, and growing buyer expectations
of comprehensive property information, the responsibility to deploy optimal digital marketing
strategies to attract buyers falls on the sellers and agents, with the latter shouldering most of the
marketing expenses (Xie, 2018). This dissertation seeks to provide empirical evidence for what,
if any, effect the digital marketing decisions of sellers and agents have on market outcomes.
2

Digital Marketing Effects on Key Stakeholders in Residential Real Estate
The digital marketing transformation evinced in the real estate marketplace has improved
the overall efficiency of the residential real estate market (Zumpano et al., 2003) with a notable
influence on all three of this industry’s key stakeholders: buyers, sellers, and agents. These
effects are evident in the buyer’s search behavior and expectations, in the seller’s listing choices
and marketing expectations, and in the agent’s redefined roles and responsibilities.
Effect on Buyers: Search Behavior and Expectations
Digital house hunting has become the predominant search strategy for homebuyers, with
91% of all buyers researching houses online before they purchase (Sirgy, 2014). Forty-four
percent claim that looking for properties online is their first step in the home-buying process
according to the National Association of Realtors’ (NAR), “Real Estate in the Digital Age
Report,” (2017b). Buyers, on average, spend anywhere from ten weeks (“Digital Age Survey,”
NAR, 2017b) to just over four months searching for their new homes (“The Home Search
Process,” Zillow, 2017). Online browsing allows them to refine their search by eliminating some
properties and honing in on others more suited to their preferences and needs (Goodwin &
Stetelman, 2013) before even to speaking to an agent (Gay & Zhang, 2014); it also decreases the
time spent physically visiting properties that do not match their needs or preferences (Pryce &
Oates, 2008).
As a result of the increasing pervasiveness of technology in the lives of consumers,
digital marketing, in general, is superseding traditional marketing. With home buyer preference
for a digitized search process, in particular, traditional real estate marketing methods (e.g.
newspaper advertisements, yard signs, print media, home and magazine books, etc.) are being
supplanted by a variety of digital resources now available, including online national and regional
3

Multiple Listing Services (MLSs), brokerage firm websites, real estate agents’ websites, social
media sites, and public sites like Realtor.com, Redfin.com, Trulia, and Zillow.com (Goodwin &
Stetelman, 2013; Sawyer, Wigand & Crowston, 2014)3. According to NAR’s “Home Buyer and
Seller Generational Trends Report 2017 and 2016: Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers” (2017a),
95% of buyers surveyed used online websites in their search. Along with assuming more of the
search responsibilities—duties that previously had been filled by the buyer’s real estate agent—
buyers have also developed expectations that property sellers and agents will provide detailed
property information with a visual component, such as photographs or videos, that is
conveniently accessible online.
Effect on Sellers: Choices and Expectations
Before buyers can purchase a home, generally one of the other stakeholders in the
residential real estate triad—most often, the home seller—must decide to sell one. Once sellers
make the decision to sell their homes, which may be their largest financial asset, they have
several choices for finding a buyer. They could assume the duties of marketing and selling the
home on their own without agent representation by listing it on For Sale By Owner (FSBO) or a
similar website; they could list the property with a non-MLS agent who would take on the
marketing role; or they could procure the marketing skills and industry knowledge of a real
estate agent with access to the MLS (Yavas & Colwell, 1995).4 Once a seller has determined a
course of action, which for the purposes of this study assumes the last choice of using an MLS
agent, assessing the marketing ability of the agent is paramount. Realtor.com identifies a listing

3

See Richardson and Zumpano (2012) for a list of real estate search engines and websites.

4

The usage, perceived benefits, and challenges associated with FSBO transactions and non-MLS brokers are two research avenues that have been
considered when discussing marketing efforts. Thus, this study does not consider them; instead it focuses specifically on the marketing efforts and
transaction outcomes of residential properties sold with MLS-affiliated listing agents.

4

agent’s marketing skills as one of the top three initial considerations sellers should make before
contracting with that agent (Colley, Jan. 13, 2016). When a seller finally signs a contracted
agreement with a listing agent, that agent takes on a fiduciary onus to put forth efforts to sell the
property (Sawyer, Wigand & Crowston, 2005).
Selecting an agent with savvy marketing skills, including digital ones, is not the only
marketing decision the property seller has to make; as part of the signed contract and before the
chosen agent can begin the initial listing process, the seller must first make specific decisions
regarding marketing the property online. In 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought and a
lawsuit against the National Association of Realtors (NAR) for anticompetitive practices; in
2008, NAR agreed to cease practices that were causing concern as part of the DOJ-NAR
settlement. Of particular note were the changes to NAR’s policies regarding Internet listing
displays (ILDs) and virtual office websites (VOWs). NAR was required to repeal its ILD policy
(and direct NAR affiliated MLSs to do the same) as well as modify its VOW policy of allowing
brokers to opt out of having their listings displayed on other brokers’ sites; in the “Modified
VOW Policy” certain decisions related to online property marketing were revoked from brokers
and relegated entirely to the seller (U.S.A. v. National Association of Realtors®, 2008; Levitt &
Syverson, 2008).
As outlined in the “Modified VOW Policy,” the seller is to make the online marketing
choices by opting-in or opting-out to each of the following four options on the signed contract:

5

1. Listing the property online in the first place (if allowed on the Internet Data Exchange
(IDX)5, then it must be listed on all VOWs as well as on third-party data
aggregators).6
2. Listing the property address.
3. Allowing an automated valuation model (AVM) calculator to be displayed alongside
the property listing.
4. Allowing third-party commentary (or what has been labeled as “blogging” in the legal
documentation) to be displayed in association with the online listing.
Sellers choose real estate professionals who they believe will meet their home selling
needs, and they expect that developing, funding, and executing the marketing plan is included in
the scope of the agent’s work for the 5-7% current fixed commission rate (Wang & Yang, 2017;
Allen, Dare, & Li, 2018). To prepare a property to be listed and marketed on an MLS and shared
across additional websites, the next step in the marketing process is determined by the agent and
consists of taking photos and/or video of the property (or hiring a professional photographer or
videographer). A 2017 survey by Zillow revealed that 75% of sellers expect that a video or some
other media will be part of the marketing strategy used to sell their property.
Effect on Agents: Redefined Roles and Responsibilities
The impact of technology on increasing buyer search behavior and expectations as well
as seller marketing choices and expectations has also affected the role played by the third

5

MLS is the database of real estate listings with member-only access and serves as the source of data for the IDX, which represents the policies
and system that allows agents to display MLS listings publically via an automatically updated data feed, thus giving listed properties online
exposure.
6
Third party aggregator sites like Zillow and Trulia do not use IDX; instead these sites obtain data from a variety of sources. Zillow has been
defined in several ways: as a third-party data aggregator (Flyer, 2018), a public site providing an alternative to MLS data (Sawyer et al., 2014), a
“home valuation website” (Hanan, 2010), and it proclaims itself to be “the leading real estate and rental marketplace” (Zillow.com). As of the 20132014 REALTOR® Technology Survey, realtor.com®, Zillow, and Trulia were the top sites where REALTORs® shared their listings.

6

stakeholder in the residential real estate process, the agent. The general duty of agents in the
housing market was, and still is, to act as an “intermediary” between buyers and sellers
throughout the purchasing and selling processes (Benjamin et al., 2002; Sawyer et al., 2014;
Allen et al., 2015). Prior to the digital revolution, the agent was considered to be the
“gatekeeper” of property information with exclusive access to knowledge about for-sale
properties (Henderson & Cowart, 2002). In their role as intermediaries with proprietary
information or as “infomedaries,” agents were tasked with collecting, reviewing, and distributing
property details to match prospective buyers to sellers (Sawyer et al., 2005). However, moving
further into the digital era, several significant shifts in the real estate professional’s role have
emerged: a diminished informative role, a later stage of entry in the home-buyer process, and a
greater need for online marketing skills, in addition to the more traditional ones, to stay
competitive.
As more and more buyers began taking advantage of the low cost search opportunities
made possible by the Internet, the need for the agent to be the “broker of information” has
lessened. Early commentators voiced concerns over the technological disruptions in the real
estate industry caused by widespread availability and accessibility of property information; many
feared it as a threat that would lead to agent disintermediation (Saber & Messinger, 2010)7, loss
in commission rates and potentially a loss of position in the market (Sawyer et al., 2014), and
even a downsizing of the entire industry (Baen & Guttery, 1997). However, despite the angst
agents may have had about the threat to their livelihood, to date, the feared outcomes have not
fully materialized; agents still play a central role in residential real estate transactions, and the

Saber and Messinger (2010) use Wigand’s (1997) definition of disintermediation: “the elimination of market intermediaries, enabling direct trading
between buyers and sellers” (p.54).
7
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standard full-service commission rate remains on average between 5-7% of the transaction price
across regions and price levels (Rutherford & Yavas, 2012).
Entering into the later phase of the home buying process actually benefits agents as less
time is spent selecting and driving potential buyers to properties that might or might not interest
them. As a result, more time can be devoted to showing the properties that the buyer has already
searched and determined to be a potential match. Additionally, the “rise of buyer’s agency”—
buyers who sign exclusive agreements with one agent, thus giving them more equality in
representation—has also given agents the opportunity for greater market power in that they can
represent both buyers and sellers (Sawyer et. al, 2014); in the case where agents are able to
represent both parties in the transaction, they can avoid having to split the commission with
another agent.
As the real estate industry as a whole has become more digital, sellers can use advances
in technology and take a do-it-yourself approach to the “the majority of the work” involved with
home selling and buying (listing the home online, marketing with photos, tours, showings, and
negotiating price, etc.); essentially, sellers could omit using a real estate agent entirely. To stay
relevant, real estate professionals need to reassert their expertise in the very area where sellers
may question their value and expense by providing high quality service in the marketing of the
properties. The high costs associated with marketing properties to attract buyers is an issue
identified by agents (Wiley, Waller, & Brastow, 2013), which may help explain why some are
slow to embrace new technology (Goodwin & Stetleman, 2013). Nevertheless, agents need to
bolster their digital marketing efforts, in addition to those more traditional efforts, as buyers and
sellers expect these services as part of home buying and selling.
While digital photos and videos are now considered customary for house listings, and
8

many agents either own high-quality digital video cameras or subcontract photo and video shoots
to third-party companies (Sawyer et. al, 2014), there is as of yet, no empirical evidence that
addresses whether or not the quality of these marketing services has economic value for the
seller (a positive effect on the sale price) or for the agent (a pay off in final commission).
Digital Marketing Efforts in MLSs
Multiple Listing Services (MLSs) in the U.S. consists of about 800 regional marketing
databases that organize and share listings into a “single pool” providing both buyers and sellers
with a significant amount of information on the real estate market (Ba & Wang, 2016) as well as
contractual and compensation data with other agents. MLSs have been dubbed as the primary
resource for most U.S. real estate transactions as well as “one of the most significant features of
the U.S.’s current real estate industry” (Li & Yavas, 2015). MLS data, which typically contains
field definitions for a listing agent to enter a property’s details, is often used as the predominant
data source for quantitative studies on residential real estate. Given that there are hundreds of
regional MLSs created by real estate professionals to share up-to-date, structured data on for-sale
properties with one another (Flyer, 2018), and the fact that each MLS maintains its own rules and
policies, variation exists as to what field definitions are included across the various databases.
Many MLSs contain field definitions identifying a variety of agent marketing efforts as several
studies using MLS data report (e.g. open houses, public open houses, electronic lockboxes,
photographs, virtual tours, etc.).
One of the useful features of the South Florida MLS used in this study is that it provides
information about two field definitions associated with digital marketing. The first field
definition captures the seller’s decision to allow (marked with a Y for yes) or not allow (marked
with an N for no) third-party comments or “blogging” to be associated with the online property
9

listing. In some MLSs, blogging is used while in others it is replaced by the clearer terminology
for the field definition, third-party commentary that will be used throughout this work.
The second digital marketing effort captured in the data is an indication of the property
having a virtual tour. The virtual tour field definition is standard across most MLSs. In the MLS
data used in this study, the field is either left blank to indicate an absence of a virtual tour, or it is
populated with a link to the specific virtual tour platform site where the virtual tour is hosted; the
link is then shared with agents of prospective buyers as well as across other MLS member sites,
and real estate websites.
Research Problem Context
While sellers and agents appear to have the shared goal of selling the home at the highest
price, there are a few issues that provide a context for the current research problem arising from
seller expectations and agent efforts: a potential agency issue and the unobservable nature of
agent efforts.
Agency issues and the moral hazard problem, according to Zumpano (2002), stem from
the need of intermediaries in certain markets where an agent is engaged to act in the best interest
of the client; the asymmetry of information in these contexts is central to these problems
endemic to markets like real estate that require intermediaries to co-align the interests of the
client with their own. The agency issue has been addressed in real estate studies with findings
revealing that agent-owned properties sold at higher prices (from 3.0% up to 7.0% more) and
remain on the market longer (3.5-10 days longer) than client-owned properties; these
implications suggest that agents may convince some sellers to accept less-than-optimal offers for
a quicker sale and spend less effort on some properties while spending more effort on others (as
relevant to their personal benefit level) (Rutherford, Springer, & Yavas, 2005; 2007; Levitt &
10

Syverson, 2008; Xie, 2018).
Wang & Yang (2017) also discuss the potential agency issue and connect it with agent
marketing effort, which is often not easily observed. This inability for sellers to observe the
marketing efforts may result in those properties perceived by the agent as less profitable
consequently given less effort level in favor of more promising opportunities. Given that sellers
often share their reservation price, or the lowest price the seller is willing to accept for the home,
the agent could pre-determine the search intensity for the buyer (Yavas & Colwell, 1995).
Nevertheless, the concern about agents maximizing marketing effort must be considered from an
agent-centered perspective as well. For example, if a home is listed for $370,000 and sells for
$350,0008 and assuming a 6% commission (or $21,000) that the listing agent will likely split
with the buyer’s agent (earning 3% at the end of the transaction), the listing agent may make up
to $10,500 in commission. For agents working with brokers, this 3% commission could even be
reduced to an average of 1.5% in final commission (Xie, 2018). If the listed house sells for
$10,000 less at $340,000, which is not as ideal for the seller who hopes for the highest price
possible, the reduction in listing agent commission after a 3% split is $10, 200, which is only a
$300 reduction in agent earnings after the transaction. Because additional effort levels of the
agent to procure the higher price for the seller’s benefit may or may not necessarily result in a
higher commission for the agent, agents must leverage a worthwhile profit against the time and
additional costs invested in marketing the home.
However, a study informing sellers about the efficacy of particular digital marketing
decisions can help them keep their listing agents accountable in performing the expected and

8

The listing price and sales price here are approximates of average list price and sale price from the data set (see Table 3.2. Summary Statistics, p.
57).
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effective marketing efforts. With the increased use of digital marketing, some marketing efforts,
such as virtual tours can be observed. Yet, even though agents are expected to provide virtual
tours, not all choose to do so on their client’s behalf. Additionally, of those virtual tours that are
provided, there is a diversity of characteristics in the platforms chosen by individual agents.
Informing agents about effects that certain digital marketing platforms have on real estate market
outcomes can help them to provide their clients with high quality but cost-effective marketing
efforts.
Research Problem Statement
Buyers now widely expect online access to detailed listings of for-sale properties; sellers
and agents need to attract these potential buyers by providing complete and accessible property
details. Property sellers and real estate professionals, ideally, share an end-goal of transacting a
successful sale, acquiring a high sale price, and doing so within a reasonable timeframe. Sellers
face the challenge of knowing whether or not it is beneficial to opt-in to allowing third-party
comments on the online property listing. Additionally, as higher sales prices are highly
correlated with the quality of a property listing—measured by photo quantity, visual quality, and
objective property descriptions (Gay & Zhang, 2014)—and virtual tours and visual information
are considered to be significant to the successful marketing of a home (Benefield, Cain, &
Johnson, 2011), sellers may choose listing agents who use the latest in video and photography
technology.9 While some agents purchase equipment and invest time to create their own virtual
tours, others pay third-party marketing firms who offer various virtual tour packages along with
platform features and services. Knowing if there are distinctions in visual quality among the

For example, photography and videography using drone technology—allowing for a bird’s-eye view of a property in its surroundings and
community—emerged in 2015, but it became more widely used in residential real estate in 2016 (Marroquin, March 21, 2017).
9
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specific virtual tour platforms chosen by agents as well as if using a specific platform influences
the sales price, marketing time, and the likelihood of a sale can also aid sellers and agents in their
marketing decision-making.
There is no empirical evidence to encourage or discourage a seller’s decision to allow
third-party comments, either as an independent digital marketing strategy or alongside an agent’s
efforts to use a virtual tour. Additionally, there are no quantitative investigations into the impact
that the quality of the virtual tour platforms may have on market outcomes. Informed sellers can
confidently opt in or out of allowing third-party comments as well as inquire about virtual tour
platform quality prior to signing a contract with a listing agent. Agents who cover the majority of
marketing costs will have better idea of whether or not they should allot their resources to
particular virtual tour platforms.
Research Questions
The research questions below derive from an attempt to address uncertainties in the real
estate industry as to what marketing strategies are effective and profitable. The main research
question is about the effects of digital marketing decisions of sellers and agents on market
outcomes with more specific research questions homing in on the seller’s decision to allow thirdparty comments, the agent’s decision to use virtual tours, and the use of particular virtual tour
platforms on the sale price, time-on-market, and probability of sale.

Main RQ: What impact do the digital marketing decisions of sellers and agents have on market
outcomes in residential real estate?
RQ1.a. What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the sale price of sold single-family residential
properties?
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RQ1.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the sale
price of sold single-family residential properties?

RQ2.a. What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the time on the market of sold single-family
residential properties?
RQ2.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the time on
the market of sold single-family residential properties?

RQ3.a What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the probability that single-family residential
properties will be sold or not sold within a given marketing period?
RQ3.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the
probability that single-family residential properties will be sold or not sold within a given
marketing period?
Relevance to Research
The research in this study fills the gap in the literature across several disciplines engaging
in digital marketing studies. In the marketing literature, suggested vanes for research include
investigations into how “digital activities generate quantifiable marketing outcomes” (Lamberton
& Stephen, 2016), and calls for greater awareness of models and theories across other
disciplines, including consumer behavior and economics, for analyzing digital marketing effects
(Kannan & Li, 2017). Echoing this need for cross-discipline cognizance, one marketing journal
editor suggests future marketing studies use concepts from other disciplines to research problems
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(e.g. econometric models) (Grewal, 2017). According to Hess et al. (2016), in academic research
considering digital transformations, there is a lack of empirical inquiry. Additionally, this study
contributes to real estate literature as the significance of marketing efforts in residential real
estate continues to be an “unsettled issue” (Cardena, 2013). Lastly, it offers the first empirical
inquiry into the research questions about the effects of the following digital marketing strategies:
1) the seller’s choice to opt-in to allow third-party comments, 2) the combined digital marketing
decision of the seller (third-party comments) with the marketing effort of the agent in offering
virtual tours, and 3) the quality of specific platforms chosen by agents may have on market
outcomes.
Relevance to Practice
Informing sellers about the impact of allowing third-party comments and using virtual
tours will help them to make important decisions when selling what may be their largest
financial asset. Ideally, sellers and agents work together to determine a mutually beneficial
digital marketing strategy (convenient and cost effective), to attract the best match of potential
buyer (one who is willing to make a favorable and timely offer) resulting in a successful
transaction (a sold property). However, there is a dearth of empirical research addressing the
issue of what, if any, impact these digital marketing decisions (separately or combined) have on
market outcomes. Though intuitively, greater exposure of for-sale properties via third-party
websites and comments may seem beneficial in reaching more potential buyers, sellers and
agents do not yet have statistical evidence of the benefits or a justification for any digital
marketing expense or proof that a combination of the digital marketing choices does or does not
actually have impact on market outcomes. Additionally, as virtual technology in real estate is at
the “tipping point” (Fisher, Lerg, & Lousiotiz, 2017), identifying distinctions between virtual
15

tour platforms that are emerging alongside advances in virtual technological capabilities and
affordability by statistically validating or invalidating them can help sellers and agents make
better decisions about which platforms are optimal for marketing properties.
Research Framework and Theory
As previously established, Lamberton and Stephen’s (2016) digital, social media, and
mobile marketing (DSMM) framework provides the overarching research context for this work
that focuses on just the digital marketing aspects10. Additionally, Kannaan and Li (2017) proffer
an inclusive and participatory understanding of digital marketing by defining it as “an adaptive,
technology-enabled process” through which companies and consumers (and other “partners”)
collaborate and “jointly create, communicate, deliver, and sustain value for all stakeholders”
adding that it is facilitated by “adaptive digital touchpoints encompassing the marketing activity,
institutions, processes and customers” (p.23). Kannan and Li’s (2017) Framework for Research
in Digital Marketing as seen below in Figure 1.1 provides a framework that both adopts and
modifies those elements of traditional marketing and marketing strategy processes and analyses
(e.g. the five Cs of customers, collaborators, competitors, context and company, and the
marketing mix of product/service, price, promotion, and place); they identify “touchpoints”
where digital technologies do or will have substantial influence and use these to categorize
research concerning digital technologies across several areas: environment, company, and
outcome as well as the relationship that market research and marketing strategy have with each
area. This research framework offers a useful context for discussing this study’s investigation of
digital marketing in residential real estate.

Using Lamberton and Stephen’s DSMM umbrella aids in situating this research firmly within DSMM reviews that focus in on works being done
in particular fields (for example, see Müller et. al (2018) for their literature review on B2B DSMM in the industrial buying context); the goal is to
endorse DSMM as well as facilitate future research.
10
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Figure 1.1. Kannan and Li (2017) framework for research in digital marketing.
Figure 1.2. Research framework for DSMM in residential real estate, is an adaptation of
Kannan and Li (2017) that is re-purposed and customized to hone in on those areas where this
current study can be situated as well as highlight where opportunities for future research on
digital marketing in residential real estate exist. The environment includes the digital space
where the buyers searching online property listings encounter homes that have allowed thirdparty comments (or not), and provide virtual tours, some of which may be hosted by third-party
marketing platforms. The company is, in this case, the seller and agent who co-determine sale
price, marketing duration, and (digital) marketing strategy; finally, the outcomes correlate to
those that have value for the seller (profitability) and agent (commissions) as well as to the
relevant residential real estate market outcomes of sale price, time on the market, and probability
of sale.
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Figure 1.2 Research Framework for DSMM in residential real estate. Adapted from Kannan and
Li (2017).

Three particular theories that emerge in both digital marketing and residential real estate
studies are information asymmetry, information overload, and search theory. These theories also
coordinate with the touchpoints in Figure 1.2 as adapted from Kannan and Li’s (2017)
framework: the customer (or buyer) in the environment and specifically, how the quantity and
quality of information made available by seller and agent (reduced information asymmetry)
affects customer search and purchase behavior (with potential information overload during
search as well as acceleration of arrival rates) and ultimately affects market outcomes. Each
theory has particular relevance to one of the three market outcomes in real estate research:
information asymmetry with sale price, information overload on time-on-market, search theory
and probability of sale.
Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry, as it pertains to for-sale single-family residency listings, is
generally high given the heterogeneous nature of the properties. The online residential real estate
marketplace (what I associate with Kannan and Li’s (2017) environment) has been linked to
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reduction in information asymmetry between buyers and sellers (Varadarjan & Yadav, 2002).
Providing detailed property descriptions and visual information online (Goodwin, Waller, &
Weeks, 2015; Carillo, 2008) can increase a buyer’s perception of the property’s value as a buyer
may associate an increase in the amount of information on a property with the quality of the
home.
Reducing information asymmetry signals (or in the terms of this study, the willingness of
the seller to allow third-party commentary, and of the agent to provide a virtual tour, as well as
provide a high quality virtual tour, etc.) may be perceived as transparency and thus affect buyer
perception of the quality of the house, resulting in the willingness to pay a higher price.
Information Overload
In the marketing literature, Ansari & Mela (2003) consider electronic communications as
an aid in customer decisions, which reduces information overload. However, Fitsimons &
Lehman (2004) note the potentially negative psychological reactance in electronic settings,
despite the ease in decision-making. Diehl (2005) also suggests a negative impact when using
simultaneous search-facilitating tools as they might degrade consumers’ choice quality. Real
estate literature argues against a negative effect of information overload on sale price claiming
that when buyers can virtually “visit” a property without having to physically see it in person,
they are able to derive a more complete information set; this is considered to be preferable
scenario for risk-averse buyers who may respond more favorably (be willing to pay amount
closer to the sales price) than with a less thorough information set (Benefield et al., 2011).
However, the tradeoff of price increase for having copious property information available
may result in an extended marketing duration; Benefield, Cain, and Johnson (2011) adopted the
following definition of information overload to test the theory on residential real estate sales:
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the amount of information actually utilized in making a decision begins to decline past a
certain point of available information. Once that point is reached, the quality or timing of
the decision suffers as the decision-maker can no longer efficiently sort through the
available information or forgets some pertinent information. (p. 404)
Allowing third-party comments as well as offering a virtual tour provides the opportunity
for property listings to increase in the quantity of information the potential buyer has to wade
through before making a decision to pursue a physical visit of the property.
Search Theory and Service Quality
Real estate studies have long used standard search theory to investigate the transaction
process and market outcomes in residential real estate (Benefield et al., 2011). With homebuyers
taking greater advantage of their ability to control the financial costs and time investment
involved in searching for homes by using online resources, sellers and listing agents market their
residential properties online and wait for buyers (or their agents) (Williams, 2018). Listing the
house with an agent increases the probability of a buyer-seller match (Yavas & Colwell, 1995) as
does lowering transactions costs (leading to higher number of property showings and thus a
larger pool of potential buyers) (Allen & Benefield, 2012). The standard premise in search theory
concerns arrival rates; as these arrival rates increase, the probability of a match increases. The
greater likelihood of a match, the more likely the property is to successfully transact within a
given marketing period.
Digital marketing itself may serve as a proxy for service quality, and overall quality, as
perceived by potential buyers, and may lead to a quicker buyer-seller match. Consumers
ascertain real estate service quality through the “virtual serviscape,” which acts as a
representation of overall quality and leads to initial contact; buyers indicate that photos and
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virtual tours are a significant part of their perception of overall consumer satisfaction (Tuzovic,
2009; Ullah & Siddiqui, 2017). Technological advancement is an area that can also be evaluated
for service quality and consumers’ first impressions are influenced by its offering of a virtual
reality (360 degree) tour (Seiler & Reisenwitz, 2010). There is also a connection between buyer
perception of quality and visual marketing with arrival rates and the value of virtual tours on
market outcomes; for example, virtual tours may be a function of the offer arrival as buyer
preference may be matched more quickly (in the case of a favorable portrayal of the property) or
not (in the case that the tour does not favorably portray the quality and buyers are dissuaded from
making offers (Fowler et al., 2018). Extending this line of reasoning about the positive or
negative quality perceptions that visual marketing may elicit, thus influencing buyer perceptions
of overall quality, this study considers whether the quality of the virtual tour itself—determined
by the characteristics of each specific virtual tour platform—has any impact of quality
perceptions leading to meaningful market outcomes. For example, potential buyers might extend
their perceptions of virtual term platform quality (as a part of service quality) to the quality of the
for-sale property, which could influence initiating contact, arrival rate and likelihood of sale.

Hypotheses
Do the digital marketing decisions to allow third-party commentary and to provide a
virtual tour create an instance of reduced information asymmetry between buyers, and thus
benefit sellers and agents or does allowing buyers to have increased property information
negatively affect the outcomes, sellers, and agents? Is providing a virtual tour from a particular
platform beneficial or disadvantageous for sellers and agents? The following hypotheses
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consider the impact of these questions on the real estate market outcomes valued by both sellers
and agents.
Based on the theories of information asymmetry, buyers appreciate attempts to reduce
information asymmetry (e.g. when sellers and agents make property information readily and
visually available by allowing third-party comments and virtual tours) and associate greater
transparency with higher quality. The perception of higher value of the property may lead the
buyer to pay more for the home; therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:
H1a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
positive impact on sales price.
H1b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on
sales price.
H1c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on sales price.
H1d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a positive impact on sales price.

Although providing detailed property information may increase sales price, there may be a
tradeoff as information overload or having too much information available about a property is
associated with having a negative effect on the decision-making timeframe, which could result in
the home to taking longer to sell as addressed in the second hypothesis.

H2a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
negative impact on time-on-market.
H2b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a negative impact on
time-on-market.
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H2c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a negative impact on time-on-market.
H2d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a negative impact on time-on-market.

A positive relationship between arrival rates and comprehensive, readily available visual
property information that is digitally marketed may be assumed to increase buyer perception of
overall quality and hasten arrival rates, which correspond to a higher probability of a successful
transaction occurring. The third hypothesis is as follows:
H3a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
positive impact on the probability of sale.
H3b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on
the probability of sale.
H3c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on the probability of sale.
H3d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a positive impact on the probability
of sale.
Overview of the Methodology
The methodology used in this study includes quantitative analysis using three
econometric models that are standard in real estate studies to determine if digital marketing
decisions of sellers and agents affect the three market outcomes of sale price, time-on-market
and the probability of sale (Benefield & Hardin, 2015; Johnson, Benefield, & Wiley, 2007).
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Assumptions
The first assumption held in this study is that digital marketing decisions made by home
sellers and real estate agents can be measured by using a quantitative method of research to
determine market outcomes. Second, this study assumes reliability in the accuracy of MLS data.
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that it represents only single-family residential properties
(as opposed to including condominiums or townhomes) from a single county for a single
calendar year. Another limitation of the study is that it may not be generalizable as housing
regions across the U.S. have variances in what housing attributes are considered favorable at any
given time (e.g. in an historic district or more historical cities, the age of the property may be
more likely to be considered a favorable quality and increase the price of the home as opposed to
older homes generally selling for lower prices). One way to overcome this limitation would be
for similar studies to be conducted for the single year for other counties similar to the one in this
study. Another option for investigating the impact of these digital marketing decisions over time
would be to extend the current study on this one area to include other years (e.g. a look at the
past ten-year data). Future years could also be considered; as one committee member suggested,
future research could include a designed study that documents all the property details in real time
as they emerge, which could allow for the collection of additional data to consider.
Delimitations
The delimitations for this study include the following: the data set is one county and one
year, and the properties had to have been sold in that year. Data restrictions are explained in
greater detail in Chapter Three: Methodology.
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Summary and Chapter Organization
Chapter 1 introduces the study, provides a background, discusses the impact of digital
advancements on marketing in the residential real estate industry for the three key stakeholders:
buyers, seller, and agents; it also gives a background of the research problem, articulates the
research questions and relevance to both research and practice, overviews the theoretical
concepts, formulates the hypotheses, overviews the methodology, and identifies the assumptions,
limitations and delimitations. The following chapters of this study are organized accordingly:
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the academic studies on residential real estate that have
emerged across the fields of Digital Marketing, Marketing, Real Estate, Finance, Economics,
Information Technology and Information Science, as well as additional miscellaneous fields.
This chapter categorizes similar research streams across the various disciplines, identifies the
gaps in the literature. Chapter 3 details the quantitative methodology used in the study. It
describes the data, its collection, the digital marketing variables identified in the data and the
additional variables used. It also describes the three market outcomes generally tested for in
residential real estate studies: the sale price, the time-on-market, and the probability of sale. In
this chapter, the models selected for the analysis are explained. They include the following:
Hedonic Pricing Model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Time-on-Market Model using
OLS, and the Probability of Sale Model using a Logistic Regression. Chapter 4 explains the
empirical findings, and Chapter 5 concludes the study with suggestions for future research and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter provides a review of the extant academic literature pertaining to digital
marketing and residential real estate emergent across several business research domains. The
review will identify overlaps in the theories used across these fields to provide a theoretical lens
for the study; it will also identify research streams/themes and denote gaps in the literature.
As Baker (2016) suggests, the very definition of marketing continues to evolve in tandem
with technological developments, thus, in this dissertation, digital marketing will be under
Lamberton and Stephen’s (2016) umbrella term DSMM (Digital Social Media Mobile)
marketing as outlined in their study focusing on DSMM topics exclusively in the marketing
research and practice domains with a limited scope of querying just marketing journals and
marketing-related industry publications. An exemplary follow up study of DSMM is Müller et al.
(2018) who describe the use of digital, social media and mobile marketing within a particular
industry, industrial marketing in the B2B context, as part of the DSMM research stream. The
current literature review similarly situates itself within the context of DSMM, with specific focus
on the first sub-area—“digital” marketing—in residential real estate industry and is the first to do
so.
Real estate is recognized as an interdisciplinary area of research (DeLisle, 2000),
therefore, the lack of a previous overview of digital marketing studies in real estate is not
altogether surprising for several reasons. First, cross-discipline research is challenging and with
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the ubiquitous impact of technology across the spectrum of research and business functions,
DSMM topics are often investigated in silos of research domains; these distinct fields often do
not employ the same terminology or use the same keywords to describe it making it challenging
for researchers to mine extant literature. Second, both digital marketing and real estate are subfields (digital marketing is under the marketing domain, and the field of real estate research
typically draws on expertise from finance and economics). Lastly, the distinct business research
functions have divergent goals, methods, and measures, and when cross-disciplinary studies are
undertaken, such as when real estate studies do consider marketing efforts or effects, the
theoretical frameworks and methodologies are most often borrowed from economics or finance
and not marketing.
Engaging with academic literature across disciplines, the review will include studies from
several fields. Marketing and real estate research is primarily engaged with relevant studies
added from information technology and information science as well as from the group
designated as miscellaneous that includes from several other fields (e.g. management and law).
Figure 2.1 shows the emergence of DSMM-related studies in real estate across several
disciplines.

Figure 2.1. DSMM in residential real estate studies across disciplines.
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Search and Article Selection Process
The timeframe for this literature review predominantly considers articles from 2000
through 2018, including articles published to date in 2018.11 However, given the dearth of
studies on digital marketing in residential real estate, case-by-case allowances were made for
studies predating 2000 as some of these earlier works laid the groundwork for subsequent
studies. The criteria for the initial search included academic, peer-viewed publications either
from Marketing or Real Estate journals; the search scope was then expanded to include academic
journals and books from additional fields such as information technology and information
systems and miscellaneous. Search queries also extended to marketing textbooks, marketing
industry articles, real estate industry sites, real estate industry trade journals, and publications as
they pertained to residential real estate and digital marketing; and real estate in general and
digital marketing.
Articles were found by searching the following databases: ABI/INFO, ProQuest,
Business Source Complete (EBSCO), Google Scholar. The following keywords were searched
for in the title, abstract, and keywords:
1. Digital Marketing (OR) Internet Marketing (AND) Residential Real Estate
2. Digital (OR) Technology (OR) Internet (AND) Residential Real Estate Marketing
Additionally, a forward and backward approach of consulting reference lists and citations to
cross check for additional works was followed (Lamberton & Stephen, 2016). Abstracts were
analyzed for the research objective, data collection methods used, methodology and main results.

11

This literature reviews follows the pattern of establishing a search time frame demonstrated by Lamberton & Stpehen (2016) who considered
marketing literature published in top-tier marketing journals between 2000-2015 and Müller et al. (2018) who include works published from 20002016.
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Articles determined to fit the criteria of study by relating to digital marketing in residential real
estate were mined for relevant contribution to the current study.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kannan and Li’s (2017) Framework for Research in
Digital Marketing (see Figure 1.1, p.16) provides a useful way to categorize the areas or
touchpoints of digital technologies across the environment, company, and outcomes as they
emerge in research on residential real estate. In the Research Framework for DSMM in
Residential Real Estate (Figure1.2, p.18) adaptation of Kannan and Li (2017), the environment
encompasses the digital space where buyers browse online property listings; the company is
composed of sellers and agents who determine the property marketing strategies; and the
outcomes relate to those that are deemed relevant market outcomes in real estate literature: sale
price, time-on-market, and probability of sale as well as the value (profitability) for the seller and
value (commissions) for the agent.
Digital Marketing Phases in Real Estate and Research Themes
The following literature review largely incorporates works from 2000 to present;
however, it is helpful to contextualize it within timeframes of the evolving relationship between
real estate and technology as described in the real estate literature. Ba and Yang (2016)
categorize these time periods into three phases: before 1995, from 1995 to 2005, and from 2005
to the present. The research streams of the studies in this literature review on digital marketing
technologies and residential real estate will be discussed according to the following
organizational structure: first, each article is discussed within the context of the phase that
coordinates with its publication date (with primary focus on the second and third phases);
second, within each time phase, studies are categorized under descriptive headings that
correspond to the touchpoints of the Research Framework for DSMM in Residential Real Estate
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(see Figure1.2, p.18): the environment consisting of the buyers; the sellers and agents
(company); the outcomes (specific market outcomes and value created for sellers and agents);
the DSMM strategy that affects all three previously mentioned areas; the market strategy, and
market research.
1905 to 1995: “Pre-Internet”
During what has been labeled as the “pre-Internet” phase of real estate (1905 to 1995),
property information was not easily accessible to consumers; this period was characterized by
limited and asymmetric information for buyers and sellers, which perpetuated market
inefficiencies. The real estate profession existed because of this market inefficiency, and agents
were the “axis of the industry” acting as gatekeepers of listing information and channels of
dissemination (Ba & Yang, 2016). One of the earliest publications in the real estate literature to
address a seller’s choice of marketing systems (For Sale by Owner vs. MLS) and its impact on
sales price uses MLS transaction data from 1977-1979; it precludes any mention of Internet use
(Yavas & Colwell, 1995). Suffice it to say, as this early phase does not reveal digital marketing
as a primary interest in the literature, no further consideration is warranted in this current study.
1995-2005: Digital Transformation
The operative word used by many researchers to describe the changes in the environment
of the real estate industry wrought by the pervasive use of the Internet during the decade of 1995
to 2005 is dramatic (Tse & Webb, 2002; Ba & Yang, 2016). Researchers Guttery et al. (2000)
and practitioners Jud and Roulac (2001) concur about signs of a “revolution” in the real estate
industry, with the latter calling it a “radical transformation.” Alongside the increases in
technology and Internet usage during this second phase, a growing anticipation of a digitized 21st
century marketplace materialized. This is demonstrated in the terminology used to describe the
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environment or digital space where real estate and technology merged: the “electronic
marketplace” (Baen & Guttery, 1997), “Internet-laden marketplace” (Guttery et al., 2000); “the
virtual marketspace” (Grover & Teng, 2001); “cyberspace (Jud & Roulac, 2001) “the virtual
marketplace” and “cyber market space” (Henderson & Cowart, 2002).
Several research themes surfaced during this phase in response to how the Internet was
changing the landscape in which real estate operated, including increases in the quality and
quantity of property information available to buyers and sellers, which allowed them to make
better-informed decisions at lower costs as well as reduced search costs for buyers. Prescreening properties via virtual tours allowed buyers to ascertain market availability and hone in
on preferences before initiating contact with an agent, saving both time in not physically visiting
ill-suited properties. Advantages also emerged for sellers as more options for marketing the
properties online became available. As the real estate profession exists precisely due to market
inefficiencies and the cost of time and expense for buyers and sellers to acquire property and
market information, a reduction in information asymmetry was expected to decrease the demand
for real estate brokerage services; several studies forecast a subsequent downward pressure on
transaction costs (agent commissions and fees), or even perhaps complete disintermediation as
well as potential legal issues over an agent’s personal jurisdiction complicated by non-local
transactions. Other studies disparaged the notion of a credible threat posed to the real estate
profession, and while acquiescing that the role of agents may be altered in the upcoming digital
age, these works refuted the concern over agent disintermediation with some even suggesting
greater opportunities like quicker reaction time to alterations in market information, would
ensue.
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At the early part of this decade, Baen and Guttery (1997) used a transaction cost
argument to suggest that an impending downsizing of the entire real estate industry was likely to
be an effect of the “convenience” of the Internet. While cognizant of the oncoming shift in real
estate to an online market, Baird and Christenson (1997, 1998) argue that despite the
conveniences and efficiencies the Internet offered, the status quo of real estate profession was
not threatened due to the financial riskiness of home buying and selling transactions, which leads
consumers to choose reliability over convenience.12
Identifying signs of a “revolution” in the real estate industry, the case study by Guttery et
al. (2000) discusses the Internet’s growing importance as a channel for disseminating “free”
information, the increasing availability of databases with market information, and the growth in
use of computers by consumers and real estate providers. Bond et al. (2000) highlight the
benefits of the Internet as leveling the playing field and increasing competition in the industry
overall. Tse and Webb (2002) concur on the rising level of competition in the real estate industry
in their evaluation of page views of broker websites. In a refutation of Baen & Guttery (1997),
Muhanna & Wolf (2002) reassert Baird and Christenson’s (1997) claim that as of 2002, the real
estate was still comfortably within the stage where reliability was valued over convenience and
price; thus, they argue against major disruption in the real estate profession. Zumpano et al,
(2003) praises the collaboration of the real estate industry with technology insisting on its benefit
for all stakeholders enabled to access and respond faster to the latest market information.

12

According to Baird and Christenson (1997, 1998), a company competes in industries by fulfilling the aspect of each of the four evolutionary
stages before moving to the next which include functionality, reliability, convenience, price (oversupply drives the transitions from one stage to
another); the authors suggest that as the real estate industry at this time was firmly established in the second stage, “reliability,” it was unlikely to
move to convenience as long as reliability was more valued.
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Emerging Digital Environment and Information-empowered Buyers
In the marketing literature from this timeframe, the literature review by Varadarajan and
Yadav (2002) on Internet marketing identifies two notable developments in the electronic
marketplace: reduced information search costs for buyers and decreasing information asymmetry
between buyers and. These ushered in the need for firms to use new marketing strategies to
maintain competitiveness.
Real estate studies echo similar themes that the Internet reduces information and
transaction costs, hastens transaction times, and may result in lower commissions (Baen &
Guttery (1997); Tucillo (1997). The “consumer-driven shift” (Tse & Webb, 2002) towards
increased efficiencies in information sharing, which benefitted all consumers, in general, enabled
homebuyers and sellers, in particular, to become “information empowered consumers”
(Benjamin et al., 2002, p.54). Studies also consider homebuyer behavior and benefits such as
buyers’ increased overall satisfaction (Benjamin et al., 2000), greater use of technology (i.e.
computers, Internet access, cell phones), increased understanding of marketing as well as the
benefits and expectations resulting from the “free” information available on the Internet (Guttery
et al., 2000); greater access to property information (“surfing the web” to review available
properties), increased search efficiency (able to search for homes with specified search criteria
such as zip codes and price ranges), and ability to make better-informed decisions at lower costs
(Benjamin et al., 2002).
Despite consumers growing expectations of agents to use the latest technology (Benjamin
et al. (2002), studies predicted that the buyer need for real agent would not change and touted
technology’s positive impact while maintaining that the real estate industry would likely remain
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“high touch” (Swanepoel, 2000; Tse & Webb, 2002); Muhanna &Wolf, 2002).13 Henderson &
Cowart (2002) find that buyers primarily search the Internet first before contacting a broker;
while Freeman (2000) finds that buyers using the Internet to search for homes use real estate
agents more often than non-Internet using home shoppers. An empirical study looking at the
way buyers use the Internet as a search tool during the home buying process revealed lower
search costs and greater buyer search intensity; however, it does not reduce search time
(Zumpano et al., 2003).
Alternative Marketing Options for Sellers
Studies published early in this phase look at the opportunities and benefits for sellers
using the Internet to market and sell properties via alternative online platforms. Bond et al.
(2000) claims that the Internet benefits consumers by lowering prices; the decrease in buyer
search costs would be advantageous for sellers who often shoulder a great percentage of the
transaction fees in paying commission costs and fees. Tse & Webb (2002) postulate that
advances in technology might even lead to a shift of commission responsibility to the buyers.
Towards the later part of this phase, studies reiterated the sellers’ need of an agent to help market
their properties (specifically in setting the price, finding a buyer, and closing the sale) (Muhanna
&Wolf, 2002).
Changes in Agents’ Informative Roles
Most research during this phase generally agrees that the Internet affects agents, but they
differ in terms of the outlook and magnitude of that impact from a threat of full-blown
disintermediation to a more positive perspective of increased opportunities by saving of time and

13

Muhanna and Wolf (2002) draw from information economists concerning three different product characteristic or qualities according to how
consumers learn about them: search (known before purchase, experience qualities (known costlessly only after purchase), and credence (expensive
to judge even after purchase)” (p. 147).
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resources. Studies also suggest that more intensive use of technology positively correlated with
higher income (even as there was found to be similar intensity of usage among both higher and
lower earning agents).
Baen and Guttery (1997) forecast a threat of real estate agent disintermediation as buyers
and sellers would no longer need traditional infomediaries, and along with Tucillo (1997)
suggest a reduced need for broker services and lower commissions. The Guttery et al. (2000)
case study considers the numerous effects of technology on real estate brokerages and provides a
warning of competitive disadvantage for those firms unwilling to embrace it; additionally, they
question realtors’ belief in the proprietary nature of property information, and foreshadow that
the power (via information) wielded by NAR and its affiliate MLSs (in an almost “cartel-like”
role (Aalberts & Townsend, 2002), would be transferred to consumers leading to a devaluation
of services provided by real estate professionals. Benjamin et al. (2002) agree that as demand for
broker service is a “function” of search cost, the decreasing search costs could reduce the need
for real estate professionals. Crowston, Sawyer, & Wigand,(2001) argue that the value of real
estate agents is not just in their access to proprietary property information as they provide value
with their social capital and social networks and act as market knowledge experts in guiding
buyers and sellers through the multifaceted transaction process. Grover and Teng (2001) identify
the Internet’s enabling of additional infomediaries such as Realtor.com that assist homebuyers
during the search process—even assuming the role of the buyer’s agent in some cases—but they
reinforce the need for agents in the purchase process, suggesting these web-based participants
work collaboratively and in “synergy with realtors at the point of purchase. Muhanna and Wolf
(2002) posit that the Internet was not as disruptive as predicted as of 2002 and assert that agent
disintermediation was unlikely. They argue that although transaction costs could be lowered by
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buyers and sellers working directly with one another, it did not necessarily result in eliminating
an intermediary as agents still play the dual role of marketing/sales agent and counselor, and
were more productive with buyers than information from Internet (e.g. they cite an example of
the 2% decrease in FSBO sales between 1997 and 1999).
While Zumpano (2002) focuses on the consequences of banks entering into the real estate
market, the study also acknowledges that an increase in agent productivity alongside decreasing
information costs and diminishing transaction time and costs could very well lead to both a
reduction in demand for agents as well as lower commissions. Aalberts and Townsend (2002)
present a cautionary address to agents pointing out potential legal concerns they might face from
Internet use and multi-state dealings by looking at the five stages of the real estate transaction
process as areas where personal jurisdiction issues arise. Revisiting the agent disintermediation
issue that may arise if too much information about properties is shared online, Gwin (2004)
analyzes factors that influence a broker’s choice of information shared on a website and finds
that brokers decisions are dependent on buyer search costs.
Outcomes of Technology Use
Agent Value: Increase in Income
Overall, technology use positively affects agent income. Bond et al. (2000) analyzed
broker websites to evaluate broker efforts to keep up with the digital environment, which
increases competition. Jud et al. (2000) surveyed real estate licensees from a regional MLS in
North Carolina and determined information technology usage has a positive effect on sales.
Sirmans and Swicegood (2000) surveyed active real estate brokers in Florida finding no lessened
intensity in computer use between lower and higher earning agents. Benjamin et al. (2002) find
that Internet and technology usage by Realtors® is positively related to income; agents who use
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new technology more intensively may earn higher income than those who do not raising income
by 11% more than those who did not. Tse and Webb (2002) note the heightened interest in online
home searches by buyers has led real estate professionals to change from simply being a market
intermediary to adding value for consumers; their empirical study of page “views” on a Hong
Kong real estate brokerage website reveals positive effects of technology on commissions and
transactions (increases sales, saves time, reduces amount of face time with buyers and sellers,
higher level of service to buyers and sellers, provides capability to share up-to-date information).
Benjamin et al. (2005) follow up their previous study on Internet use and broker income to
investigate it as an avenue for marketing and communications; the findings reveal a positively
relationship between Internet use and the financial performance of residential real estate firms,
overall.
Market Outcomes
As technology use in general was the focus during this digital transformation phase in
residential real estate, few studies addressed particular technologies and their incomes on market
outcomes. Benjamin and Chinloy (1995) provide empirical evidence that sales price increases
due technology. Gordon, Salter and Johnson (2002) consider the potential effect of online
applications (searchable property databases) on the sale price and marketing time of difficult to
show properties (ones that may have pets, specified showing times, etc., and may have been
given less marketing effort by utility maximizing brokers); the results indicate that broker efforts
over market outcome in this case, are not significant.
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Early Digital Marketing Strategy: Beginnings of the “Virtual” Tour
Studies addressing the developments in digital marketing during this phase focus on the
increased use of technology as a way to provide property information to potential buyers. The
Internet changed the “methods” used by real estate professionals in marketing properties (Tse &
Webb, 2002). Hendricks (2002) looks at the digital marketing and transactions of real estate
brokers as an additional source of real estate data that can be compiled and analyzed for an indepth understanding of the way information communications technology (ICT) can support
governmental real estate decisions.
Although most of these studies are not direct inquiries into the effects of digital
marketing per se, many mention the use of virtual tours as an emergent strategy to market
properties online. Bond et al. (2000) predicted more prevalence of the “virtual reality
walkthrough,” and Benjamin et al. (2002) mentioned websites with virtual tours of home
interiors that allowed a 360 degree view of every room. Hendricks (2002) describes floor plans
and virtual tours as real estate objects available on the "playground" of the Internet and
highlights the user-value provided by these options. Henderson and Cowart (2002) discuss the
lag in commercial real estate sector behind residential real estate in capitalizing on the
opportunities made possible by the “virtual marketplace” noting that some brokers augment
websites with photos or webcam virtual tours of property interiors. Tse and Webb (2002) assert
that many real estate professionals invest in electronic digital cameras for photos and VCRtapings of properties that can be accessed directly through the Internet enabling potential buyers
can take “tours” without having to physically visit the property.
In their work on properties that a broker may consider difficult to show, Gordon et al.
(2002) discuss how online applications can aid brokers in that they enable potential buyers to
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prescreen properties via virtual tours; they suggest that this technology is beneficial as buyers
could get a virtual sense of the homes prior to a physical visit. One of the most interesting
assertions about the use of virtual tours in digitally marketing residential properties could be a
potential disruption for agents comes from a study that is not about marketing at all. In a study
on the potential legal issues for agents that might arise alongside the opportunities afforded by
the Internet, such as multi-state transactions, Aalberts and Townsend (2002) discuss virtual tours
offerings as virtual walkthroughs of homes from each room to the neighborhood with panoramic
shots enable viewers to zoom in to see certain features up close. They also suggest that viewings
of virtual tours will likely speed up and advance overall buyer search and assessments; thus,
creating greater efficiencies and posing the “biggest threat yet” to real estate professionals.
2005-Present: Disruptive Technologies
The timeframe from 2005 to present is now characterized by an embrace of digital
technologies and significant reduction in information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, in
general (Kannan & Li, 2017), and between agents and consumers, in particular, as the latter are
not merely just accessing property information as they are now active participants involved in the
production and disbursement of information (Ba & Yang, 2017). Research on the effects of
technology and the Internet has been replaced by more detailed attention to individual aspects
such as direct marketing and benefits to buyers, buyer search behavior, the empowerment of
sellers (to co-determine online marketing strategies), consumer expectations of service quality
from agents (e.g. specific technology-enabled marketing and quality perceptions derived from
digitally marketed visual information), and evaluations of websites with critiques on the
deployment of disruptive technologies.
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Consumer-centric and Digitized Landscape
The efficiencies of direct marketing (from seller to buyer) drive down costs and benefit
all consumers and present a particular threat to the status quo in real estate. Echoing earlier
literature on this issue, Keillor (2007) notes the movement of the residential real estate industry
away from agent-centric marketing (where proprieties were typically marketed agent-to-agent) to
directly marketing to consumers. Prior to this phase, agents “controlled the inventory,” and
Keillor (2007) heralds the consumers as “revolutionaries” whose expectations of a “free and
open market” exert pressure on the industry as a whole to change its “archaic practices and
monopolistic attitudes,” to lower prices, allow more consumer participation in the process, and
provide better access to property information (p.172). Richardson and Zumpano (2012) trace
the growing Internet search usage from 2006 to 2009 finding it positively effects both buyer
search time and intensity. Beracha and Wintoki (2013) consider online buyer search activity as
indicative of future home buying intention and find that search intensity anomalies in certain
areas, as determined by search queries on Google, are predictive of that area’s future abnormal
home price changes. By the time of Koch & Maeir’s (2015) study, homebuyers were still
increasingly relying on the Internet for pre-searching activities as had been predicted early on
and continually affirmed (Bond et al., 200l; Tse & Webb, 2002; Benjamin et al. 2005; Seiler et
al., 2012).
Effects of Internet Use on Outcomes
In the real estate literature, most studies are quantitative, with many relying on MLS data
of diverse regional MLSs, and focus on three particular market outcomes: sales price, time on the
market and probability of sale. Studies on Internet usage in real estate literature focus on buyer
search intensity (as seen above) as well as seller marketing options and agent marketing efforts
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and how they effect the sales price, the price differentiations for properties marketed on MLS
and other websites, the duration of marketing periods, and the likelihood of a successful
transaction within a given marketing time.
Marketing Choices Empower Sellers
During this phase, consumers at large were gaining technology mastery, and Internet use
was increasingly becoming more a part of everyday life (having passed 50% penetration by
2005) and as a result was being shaped by consumers who valued online networks as digital
marketplaces for buyers and sellers (Lamberton & Stephen, 2016). Whereas other intermediarybased consumer services experienced a decline during this time as the Internet increased direct
marketing and selling and buying options (e.g. industries like travel, auto-insurance, etc., Levitt
& Syverson, 2008), the real estate industry maintained its relevance. Residential real estate
studies focus on the options that the Internet provides to the growing number of digi-savvy
owners who can use alternative online platforms, other than MLS, to market and sell their
properties. Overall, the findings are consistent: properties marketed by non-MLS brokers
(including discount or flat-fee brokers) or marketed and sold directly by home owners, on
average, sell for a higher price, but take more time to sell, and have a lower likelihood of selling
in a given marketing period than those by MLS-affiliated brokers.
Ford, Rutherford and Yavas’ (2005) study of residential properties marketed
simultaneously on the Internet and MLS reports a longer time-on-market and higher sale price
(albeit both are marginal). Li and Motiwalla (2009) note that that there is no significant price
difference between houses sold by brokers and those sold as For Sale By Owner (FSBO)
transactions marketed on the MLS. Residential property marketing and sales comparisons of the
FSBO and MLS platforms suggest FSBO is less effective as the property sells at a lower price,
41

takes longer time to sell, and decreases in the probability of it selling (Hendel, Nevo & OrtaloMagne, 2009). Allen, Dare and Li (2018) investigate the effects of MLS-member information
sharing intensity on market outcomes finding that a “one unit increase in the average daily
number of views by MLS members during a house’s marketing period” increases the probability
of sale, decreases the time-on-market, and increases the transaction price, thus benefitting house
sellers who hire services of MLS-member brokers.
Johnson, Springer, and Brockman (2005) highlighted the opportunities and advantages
becoming available as a result of technology growth in their study investigating the effects of
non-traditional marketing, where sellers use broker assistance in non-MLS marketed platform
and find a 6% premium when compared to homes brokered on MLS. Rutherford et al. (2005)
test whether asymmetric information creates a disadvantage for homeowners for price setting and
negotiations and find that broker-owned homes do not sell faster than client-owned homes, but
they do sell at a 4.5% price premium compared to client-owned homes. Ford, Rutherford and
Yavas’ (2005) study of residential properties marketed simultaneously on MLS and on the
Internet reports a longer time-on-market and higher sale price (albeit both are marginal). Levitt
& Syverson (2008) look at the impact of using discount agents on sale price and time on the
market finding that these properties did not experience much price differentiation, there was a
longer marketing time. Goodwin, Johnson and Zumpano (2013) find higher prices with the trade
off of extended marketing times and thus a lower probability of finding a match with a buyer in a
given marketing period when sellers pay for limited service brokers (picking and choosing “a la
carte” style from a menu of services with itemized fees, e.g. hiring a broker just to list property)
but then market the property on their own as opposed to using full-service broker services (from
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staging, listing, home inspections, full services and paying commission fee based on percentage
of the final sale of the home at the closing).
Marketing Efforts Enhance Agent Competitive Advantage
Information systems and information technology research identify information
communication technologies (ICT) as amenable for the needs of the information-driven real
estate industry. While technology was considered to be disruptive and a threat to many who
feared disintermediation and predicted downsizing of agent workforce, optimistic participants
envisioned a more competitive market with less time needed for brokering information and more
time available for providing additional services. Agents’ pervasive use of information as a way
to support buyers and sellers during the transaction process lessens the impact of their
diminishing roles as intermediaries of information (Sawyer et al., 2014). ICT systems have also
been called “digital technologies” that offer support to consumer-centric industries, such as
residential real estate; leveraging digital strategies is touted to provide competitive advantage to
those early adopters of digital initiatives (Loonam et al., 2018).
As digital replaced analogue, traditional marketing efforts were displaced by digital
options. Studies on the effects of marketing strategies used by brokers to promote the sale of a
property have investigated both traditional methods (e.g. public open houses and broker open
houses; Allen et al., 2015) as well as those more technologically based. Goodwin, Waller
&Weeks (2013) provide an extensive overview of real estate marketing effort studies in the real
estate literature primarily. Previous studies done on a variety of agent marketing efforts in
residential real estate report varying empirical results of inconsequential or both negative effects
and positive effects on market outcomes (Xie, 2018).
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Studies on the impacts of technology-related marketing efforts in residential real estate
include the following: satellite imagery (Benefield et al., 2012); showing schedule services
(Allen & Benefield, 2012); and online marketing time (time on Internet) in relationship to agent
location (Koch & Maier, 2015). In a study on the impact of technological changes on residential
real estate (e.g. using electronic lock-boxes), Benefield and Morgan (2013) situate their
argument in favor of an agent’s willingness to invest in technology within other studies
addressing agent effort level and success as measured by income and embrace of technology
such as the use of computers, digital cameras, cellular phones, software programs, and email
communications, Internet use, websites, real estate links on webpages; echoing earlier studies,
agent effort in these areas is positively related to agent income Allen et al. (2018) consider listing
agent effort level to “maximize payoff” with information sharing intensity (e.g. the agent has to
determine how much effort to exert); however, their model does not analyze the listing agent’s
effort choices (see Rutherford et al., 2005; Bian et al., 2015 for factors affecting listing agent’s
effort choice). In a study finding an increase in online marketing time in relation to agent
location (particularly, if the agent lived outside the city limits); however, Koch and Maeir (2015)
did not include any digital marketing efforts in their analysis.

Outcomes of Digitized Visual Information and Virtual Tours
Visual Information
In determining the market outcome effects of agent digital marketing efforts collected in
MLS data, prior studies have concentrated on MLS photographs (online) and MLS virtual tours
(online videos). Providing visual information positively influences marketing time for a property
(Benefield, Cain & Gleason, 2012). Carillo (2008) and Allen et al. (2015) agree on a positive
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price effect (albeit with differentiation in the percentage of the effect) when additional MLS
photographs beyond the minimum (of what number) requirement are included; they have
divergent results for time-on-market with a decrease in time-on-market (Carillo, 2008), and
increase in time-on-market (Benefield, Cain, & Johnson, 2011; Allen et al., 2015). Additionally,
Allen et al., (2015) report that listings with six or more photos have an increased probability of
sale.
Goodwin and Stetelman’s (2013) survey-driven study reports the findings of two surveys
of homebuyers – the first, conducted in 2003, found that online photographs were useful for
buyers with higher incomes and those in the suburbs and less useful for older buyers. The follow
up survey in 2009 reports that small-town buyers, buyers with one or two children, unmarried
couples, and buyers of existing homes found the online photos to be more useful when compared
to buyers with no children, married couples, and buyers of new homes. According to the Seiler et
al. (2012) study on ocular tracking, eye-movement behavior of homebuyers reveals a
predominant focus on visual elements of online property listings and thus, considers including
photographic images and videos of properties to be one of the most effective marketing
strategies.
Virtual Tours
In a study published early in this last phase, Kucirek (2005) claims that using technology
such as virtual tours would become the “norm” in real estate. Nwogugu (2005) identifies
marketing properties via virtual tours as a marketing trend contributing to the economic, legal and
public policy issues impacting the New York metro-area housing market during this time. Mak,
Choy, and Ho (2008), identify virtual tours as one of the activities of homebuyers during their
search process along with accessing information about neighborhood and quality of life,
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ascertaining affordability of properties by price ranges, and comparing mortgage financing
options. Studies considering the use, effects, and value of virtual tours in residential real estate are
quite varied in both methodology and findings.
Perceived Value and Service Quality
Goodwin and Stetelman (2013) surveys of the perceived utility of virtual tours by
homebuyers in 2003 and 2009 respectively find that in 2003, virtual tours were deemed useful by
specific buyers: suburbians, single women, and married couples. By 2009, virtual tours were still
regarded as useful by single women and additionally by buyers with children and higher
incomes, but they were not deemed as useful for older buyers and married couples. Arndt et al.
(2017) consider the “halo effect” on buyer impressions of online property listings in their
experimental study to test for buyer judgment bias arising from preference for agent
attractiveness, gender, and pathos while taking a web-based tour of properties (accompanied by
audio descriptions); findings suggest buyer perception of online listings is not greatly influenced
by homophily (similar demographic characteristics between agents and buyers), attractiveness
(male of female), or pathos. To note is that buyers paying more for a home are less influenced in
their overall impression.
Tuzovic (2009) finds that consumers ascertain real estate service quality through the
“virtual serviscape,” which acts as a representation of overall quality and leads to initial contact.
More than half of the buyers surveyed indicated that photos and virtual tours are a significant
part of their perception of overall consumer satisfaction of a real estate firm’s service quality
(Tuzoic, 2009). Seiler and Reisenwitz (2010), in a study on the value of service quality to
leverage competitive edge in real estate, they identify technological advancement as an area that
can also be evaluated for service quality; in a their refinement of an existing real estate survey
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model, they pose questions to determine the consumers’ first impressions of a firm and
specifically address the firm’s website offering of a virtual reality (360 degree) tour.
Ullah and Siddiqui (2017) also equate virtual tour offerings on real estate websites with
service quality and customer satisfaction. Fowler et al. (2018) make the connection between
buyer perception of quality and visual marketing with arrival rates and the value of virtual tours
on market outcomes; they assert that while virtual tours are not “home attributes” per se, and
thus, do not have overt sway over buyer evaluation of a residential property, the selling price
may be indirectly impacted during the offer stage of the transaction process (i.e. virtual tours
become a function of the offer arrival) as buyer preference may be matched more quickly or not
(in the case that the tour does not portray the property favorably, and in turn, dissuades buyers
from making offers).
Virtual Tour Effects on Market Outcomes
Rutherford, Springer & Yavas (2005), Carillo (2008), Benefield et al. (2012) and Allen et
al., (2015) use MLS data and quantitative methodology to consider the impact of virtual tours (as
one of the independent variables) on market outcomes with mixed results: some identify a
negative relationship between time-on-market and MLS virtual tours while others find a
significant and positive effect even up to an extension of marketing time by 51% (Carillo, 2008).
Fowler et al. (2018) finds homes with virtual tours spend less time on market. Benefield et al.
(2012) and Allen et al., (2015) and Fowler et al. (2018) also all report that listings with MLS
virtual tours have higher sale prices. Allen et al., (2015) extends the research to consider the
effect of MLS virtual tours on probability of sale finding that listings with virtual tours have a
higher probability of selling. Allen, Dare and Li (2017) find that using virtual tours has a
negative marginal effect on probability of sale by 3.1%.
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Xie’s (2018) ten-year quantitative study from 2000-2010 on the agents’ effort level in
selling their own homes showed that only 5% of agent-owned homes in the sample had virtual
tours while 8% of the client-owned homes had virtual tours. Interestingly, while agents did not
use virtual tours for their own properties as much as they did for their seller clients, the agent
homes sold for a higher price even though they took longer to sell. This finding seems to suggest
that agents are willing to take a longer time in selling their own properties, and when not under
direct observation of an anxious seller, will make cost-saving decisions (e.g. not pay for a virtual
tour) to gain as much on the final sale price as possible (Xie, 2018).
Recent developments in residential real estate digital marketing research involve the uses
and effects of social media and virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) in real estate.
Niveditta and Padmavathy (2017) identify Facebook as a platform that can be effectively
leveraged by the real estate industry with its targeted advertisements, capabilities for posting
photos and videos for virtual visits of properties and for accepting inquiries. The work of
Babatunde & Ajayi (2018) investigates the effects of ICT via social media applications on real
estate transactions in the emerging economy of Nigeria finding that ICT has a positive impact on
real estate work just as it does in more developed countries. Sihi (2016) examines the impact of
VR and AR and on the consumer purchase decision-making in digital and multi-channel
environments; eliciting feedback from homebuyers and agents, the study finds that using these
technologies (as long as they offer high-quality experiences) can provide competitive advantage
for realtors. Ullah and Siddiqui (2017) categorize interactive technologies like GIS navigation
tools, real time locating systems, VR, AR, indoor scanning technologies (in addition to virtual
tours) as disruptive technologies emerging in real estate industry; in the study, they point to a gap
between the technological capabilities and their usage on the top U.S. real estate websites,
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including Zillow (as well as the top sites in Australia) and provide a SWOT analysis as a
suggested framework for analysis.
Gaps and Opportunities for Research Contributions
To date, there are two predominant gaps in the real estate literature concerning the effects
of digital marketing strategies. First, there are not any studies, qualitative or quantitative,
investigating the impact of a seller’s digital marketing decision to allow third-party comments in
association with the online property listing either on its own or as part of a combined digital
marketing strategy with the agent’s effort of providing a virtual tour. Second, while several
previous studies address the digital marketing effort of the agent to use a virtual tour, in general,
they do so within the context of discussing other marketing efforts. To date, there is an
unfulfilled opportunity to contribute to the literature concerning the specific virtual tour platform
choice, its quality, and its effect on market outcomes of sale price, time on the market and
probability of sale.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the data, its collection procedures, and the methodology. Included
in the statistical analysis will be a variable legend, summary statistics, and explanations of the
three most commonly used metrics to determine real estate outcomes: sales price, time-onmarket and probability of sale. These econometric models will be used to test the impact of the
two digital marketing variables of interest of Third-Party Comments and Virtual Tours to
determine whether or not there is a measurable and statistically significant impact on the price
that a property finally sells at, how long it takes to sell a property, and whether the property will
sell within a given marketing time. The impact of the digital marketing variables (as independent
variables) will be instrumented with the following models:


Sale Price – Hedonic pricing model (OLS) – with Sale Price as the Dependent Variable



Time-on-Market (OLS) – Time-on-market as the Dependent Variable



Probability of Sale (Logit) –SOLD (1 if SOLD, 0 otherwise) as the Binary Dependent
Variable

Additionally, an investigation and comparative analysis of several of the most-utilized real estate
marketing platforms and one well-known social media platform used for virtual tours are
conducted.
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Data and Collection
The data set for this analysis is cross sectional and collected from a southeast Florida
MLS; it consists of a total of 22, 838 observations of single-family residential property
transactions listed for sale between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016. The data include all
successfully marketed properties (sold) as well as those properties with failed marketing efforts
(unsold) as indicated by expired or withdrawn from the market. As Allen, Dare and Li (2018)
point out, MLS data is “notoriously messy” with missing or incomplete information as well as
invalid or nonsensical values (suggestive of data entry errors); thus, listings with omitted
information or inconsistencies were eliminated from the sample. The final parsed data sample
consists of 14,805 observations comprised of 13,090 sold properties (88%) with a remaining
1,715 observations designated as unsold properties (12%).
The data collected from the MLS also includes the following information for each
property: list price, sale price, days on the market, various physical property characteristics
(number of bedrooms, bathrooms, pool, water view, and specification of roof tile), geographic
location (zip code), vacancy status, contract and calendar-related information (including dates for
when properties were listed, sold, expired or withdrawn). Data was also collected on the digital
marketing activities include the indication of the sellers’ choice of opting-in (yes) or opting-out
(no) of allowing “blogging” or third-party comments and whether the property has a virtual tour
(as indicated by either a blank data field for no virtual tour or indicated by a web link to the site
hosting the virtual tour). Thus, the data field not only reveals the presence of a virtual tour (or
not), it also provides a link to the specific platform that provides the tour (with the name of the
platform included in the web link).
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Benefield et al. (2012) and Benefield and Hardin (2015) recommend using a relatively
homogenous sample in order to eschew observations with large differences between the observed
value of the dependent variable and the predicted value (residuals); thus, to make the sample
relatively more homogeneous, restrictions are imposed on the raw data. Housing physical
features that could be considered “anomalies,” such as single bathrooms and uncharacteristically
larger-sized homes, are intentionally excluded so the pricing, time-on-market, and probability of
sale models may more accurately assign variability (Benefield, Cain, & Johnson, 2011). Thus,
the data set will be limited to properties that contain 2 to 5 bedrooms and 1 to 4 bathrooms, with
a list price between $125, 000 – $1M and a minimum and maximum square footage of 800 sq. ft.
and 8,000 sq. ft.). Table 3.1 Variable Legend presents a list of the variables used in the analysis
accompanied by a brief description for each one.
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Table 3.1. Variable Legend
Variable
SOLD

Variable Description
1 if the property was sold, 0 otherwise

UNSOLD

1 if the property was unsold, 0 otherwise

LP

Listing price of the property as reported in MLS

SP

Transaction price of the property as reported in MLS

TOM

Days from list date to under contract date or expired date

TPC_Yes

1 if seller opts-in to allowing third-party comments, 0 otherwise

TPC_No

1 if seller opts-out of allowing third-party comments, 0 otherwise

VIRTUALTOUR_Yes

1 if presence of Virtual Tour link, 0 otherwise

VIRTUALTOUR_No

1 if absence of Virtual Tour link, 0 otherwise

INSTATOUR

1 if property allows Third-party Commentary and has a Virtual Tour, 0
otherwise
1 if property has Insta Tour, 0 otherwise

VIRTVIEWS

1 if property has Virtual Views Florida Virtual Tour, 0 otherwise

TPCxVT

PREMPIX

1 if property has Premier Pix Virtual Tour, 0 otherwise

YOUTUBE

1 if property has YouTube Virtual Tour, 0 otherwise

ALLOTHERVT

1 if property has any other Virtual Tour, 0 otherwise

POOL

1 if the property has a pool, 0 otherwise

BEDS

Number of bedrooms

FULL-BATH

Number of full bathrooms

HALF-BATH

1 if the property has at least one half-bath, 0 otherwise

STILE

1 if property has a Spanish tile, 0 otherwise

VACANT

1 if property is vacant, 0 otherwise

WATER

1 if property is located on the water or has a water view, 0 otherwise

ZIP 1-51

1 if property is located in Zip 1 (through Zip 51), 0 otherwise

FFR

Monthly average Federal Funds Rate on the list date

Additional explanations for the dependent and independent variables are as follows:
Dependent Variables
SP – the final sale price of the home.
TOM – the MLS data field reporting on time-on-market is designated DOM for “days on
market”; however, given inconsistent calculating methods among listing agents, potential
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inaccuracies may emerge. Thus, a new variable, the time on the market, TOM, is created for each
property. TOM can be calculated in several ways, and reporting computations used to determine
TOM is essential if studies are going to be replicable or to even facilitate comparative studies
(Benefield & Hardin, 2015). For this study, TOM is calculated by subtracting the contract date
(closing) from the initial list date for the successes (SOLD) and from the expired or withdrawn
date for those that failed to transact (UNSOLD).
SOLD/UNSOLD – this variable is determined by the initial list date for the successes (SOLD)
and the expired or withdrawn date for those that failed to transact (UNSOLD).14
Independent Variables
Digital Marketing Variables
The MLS from which the data were collected contains additional fields: Third-party Comments15
and Virtual Tours.


Third-party Comments (TPC): On behalf of sellers, agents populate the data field
labeled “blogging” or third-party comments to indicate whether the seller has opted-in
(YES) or opted-out (No) to allow third-party commentary to be associated with the
online listings of their properties



Virtual Tour (VT): In the virtual tour data field, agents provide a web link to the online
platform where the virtual tour is hosted. If there is no virtual tour, this data field is left
blank.

Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2005) and Huang and Rutherford (2007) argue for including both SOLD and UNSOLD in probability models
claiming distribution of ALL activity across the market should be included in analysis.
14

While in this MLS, the data field is denoted as “blogging,” in other MLS it is referred to as “third-party comments.”

15
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Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour (TPCxVT): is the new variable created if
property listing has the combination of opting-in to third-party comments and a virtual
tour.



Specific Virtual Tour Platforms (INSTATOURS, VIRTVIEWS, PREMPIX16,
YOUTUBE, and ALLOTHERVT): new variables from the virtual tour links indicating
the platforms of the virtual tour of the top three most frequent virtual tours in the data
set: Insta Tour (INSTATOUR), Virtual Views (VIRTVIEWS), and Premier Pix Florida
(PREMPIX), and the well-known social media video platform, YouTube.
ALLOTHERVT accounts for the over fifty other platforms providing virtual tour links in
the data sample.

Market Indicators
ZIP Codes (ZIPS) - constructed dummy variables for each of the 51 zip codes as a proxy for
location
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) – calculated as the monthly average FFR on the list date (properties
listed in 2015 and sold in 2016 are included in sample); acts as a proxy for macroeconomic
indicator of market conditions; according to Goodwin et al. (2013) using FFR as a proxy for
“credit cost” and “market-swing control…captures any variability caused by market condition to
which rates are historically tied” (p. 484).
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis are shown in Table 3.2. The
oldest house considered in the analysis is 80 years old, and the longest time-on-market

16

To answer the research questions regarding specific platform use, this study considers three virtual tour platform companies in addition to
YouTube. The names of the virtual tour platform companies have been altered in this study to the pseudonyms of Insta Tours, Virtual Views, and
Premier Pix.
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considered is 366 days. The average property in the study had a list price of $372, 126 and an
average sale price of approximately $350, 554. The average marketing time was approximately a
little over three months (approximately 105 for all properties listed and 96 days from listing date
to contract date for those that sold). The average property was approximately 29 years old. A
typical home in the sample has about 2,682 square feet with an average of 3.3 bedrooms and 2.2
full. Of the data set, 10% of the homes had two bedrooms, 55% had three, 27% had four, and 8%
had five; 4% had only one full bathroom, 71% had two, 20% had three, and 5% had four, with
25% having a half-bath. 20% of the properties were vacant. Spanish tile roofing was used on
22% of the homes, 38% had pools, and 25% had a water view. Federal Funds Rate at the time the
properties were listed in 2015 and 2016 ranged from .12 to .54.
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics
All (Sold and Unsold)

Sold

Unsold

Variable

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Mean

Std.Dev.

Mean

Std.Dev.

SP

-----

-----

72,000

1,150,000

350,554.5

151477.9

-----

-----

LP

372,126

164821.3

125,000

1,000,000

364,425.4

159851

430, 902.5

188,667.6

TOM
TXSQFT
AGE
BEDS
FULL BATH
HALF-BATH
POOL
WATERVIEW
SPANISH TILE
VACANT

104.7869
2682.106
28.91354
3.326309
2.260858
0.2497129
0.3781155
0.2493077
0.2161432
0.2026342

64.96179
942.7355
16.06009
0.758301
0.6036549
0.4328615
0.484933
0.4326269
0.411627
0.4019758

1
805
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0

367
7,967
79
5
4
1
1
1
1
1

96.07227
2, 652.261
28.98801
3.313522
2.243239
0.2394194
0.3748663
0.2501146
0.212987
0.2093201

57.43626
924.0139
15.96882
0.7518692
0.5904689
0.4267454
0.4841069
0.4330954
0.4094342
0.4068388

171.3026
2,909.902
28.34519
3.423907
2.395335
0.3282799
0.4029155
0.2431487
0.2402332
0.1516035

79.05473
1047.583
16.73431
0.7992192
0.6814609
0.4697242
0.4906271
0.4291093
0.4273496
0.3587407

FFR

0.3852983

0.0379608

0.12

0.54

0.38618

0.0386738

0.3785648

0.0311941

Variables of Interest
TPC
VT
TPCxVT
INSTA TOURS
VIRTVIEWS
PREMPIX
YOUTUBE
ALLOTHERVT

0.8546437
0.3086795
0.2401891
0.0714623
0.0331645
0.0318136
0.0110773
0.1611618

0.3524716
0.4619642
0.4272126
0.2576043
0.1790719
0.1755094
0.1046679
0.3676925

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.8598167
0.3048892
0.2395722
0.0634072
0.0343774
0.0334607
0.0115355
0.1621085

0.3471904
0.4603781
0.4268387
0.2437032
0.1822035
0.179843
0.1067864
0.3685644

0.8151603
0.3376093
0.244898
0.1329446
0.0239067
0.019242
0.0075802
0.1539359

0.3882806
0.4730325
0.4301521
0.3396139
0.1528031
0.1374145
0.0867589
0.3609925
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As shown more clearly in Figure 3.1, opting-in to allowing third-party comments (TPC)
was opted-in for 85% of ALL properties listed with only 15% opting-out, and in 86% of SOLD
(11, 255 out of 13,090) and 82% of UNSOLD (1,398 out of 1,715). Virtual Tours (VT) were
available for approximately 31% of the ALL listed properties while 69% did not have one.
Agents provided VT in approximately 30% of homes that SOLD17 and in 34% of UNSOLD.

Figure 3.1. Digital marketing activities across data sample.
The number of properties that had the combination of virtual tour and opted-in to third-party
comments (TPCxVT) was the same at about 24% across ALL (3,556 of 14, 805), SOLD (3,136
of 13,090) and UNSOLD (420 of 1,715).

17

This 30% of virtual tour offerings for sold properties is a significant percentage when compared to the 4% of virtual tour offerings of the sold
properties in the data set reported by Allen et al. (2015); also, their analysis included transactions over a four and a half year period from January
2004 through June 2008, whereas the sample set of the current study is for a single year. Fowler et al. (2018) use data from March 2008 to August
2015 finding virtual tours used in 35% of the data set, which is consistent with this study’s 31% of properties offering a virtual tour.
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List Price Ranges and Digital Marketing
Figure 3.2 shows the list price ranges of low ($125,000 to 250,000), mid ($250,000+ to
$500,000), mid-high ($500,000+ to $750,000) and high ($750,000 to $1M) across the data
sample for ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD properties. More than half of ALL homes for sale, at
60%, were in the mid list price range followed by 23% of the homes falling in the low list price
range, 13% in the mid-high price list range, and the smallest number of homes for sale (only 4%)
in the high-list price range. 60% of the SOLD homes were also in the mid list price range
followed by the low range with 25%, mid-high with 12%, and high with 3%. The list price range
was observed to see if any insights could be gleaned regarding the digital marketing efforts as
they related to the prices that houses were listed at when marketing efforts were initiated.
List Price Ranges of ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD
70%

60%

60%

60%
56%

50%

40%

30%
25%

24%

21%
20%
16%
13%

12%

10%

7%
4%

3%

0%
ALL (14,805)
Low $125 to 250 (3496)

SOLD (13,090)
Mid $250+ to 500 (8817)

Mid-High $500+ to 750 (1935)

UNSOLD (1, 715)
High $750+ to 1M (557)

Figure 3.2. List price ranges across data sample
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of digital marketing strategies across each list price range for
ALL, SOLD and UNSOLD. TPC was consistently used across all list price ranges for the entire
sample, ALL, with the mid-high list price range having the highest at 87% of the properties that
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SOLD, again, the mid-high list price range had the highest occurrence of TPC at 88%, while for
UNSOLD, the high list price range of had the highest percentage of homes allowing TPC at
85%. VT had the highest percent of use across the mid-high and high list price ranges across
ALL (both at 45%), SOLD (45% and 44%) and UNSOLD (43% and 48%). VT in the mid list
price range were also consistent comprising 32% of ALL, SOLD, UNSOLD with the low list
price range having the lowest percentage of VT at 17% (ALL and SOLD) and 19% (UNSOLD).
The combined Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour had the largest percentages in the midhigh list price range for ALL (37%) and SOLD (38%), but was the second largest in the
UNSOLD at 34% trailing the highest list price range having 39% of the UNSOLD properties
with both Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour. Again, the presence of the combined
TPCxVT was consistent in the lowest list price range across ALL (12%), SOLD (12%), and
UNSOLD (11%) and fairly consistent in the mid list price range ALL (25%), SOLD (26%), and
UNSOLD (23%).

100%

% of Digtial Marketing Strategies Across List Price Ranges for ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD
90%
86%

88%

87%
85%

86% 86%
84%

85%

84%
82%

83%
81%

80%

70%

60%

50%

48%
45% 45%

45%

40%

37%

44%

43%
39%

38%
36%

35%

32%

34%

32%

32%

30%
26%

25%

23%
19%

20%

17%

17%
12%

12%

11%

10%

0%
ALL TPC 85%

ALL VT 31%

ALL TPCxVT 24%

SOLD TPC 86%

$125 to 250 (23%)

SOLD VT 30%

$250+ to 500 (60%)

SOLD TPCxVT 24%

$500+ to 750 (13%)

UNSOLD TPC 82%

UNSOLD VT 34%

UNSOLD TPCxVT 24%

$750+ to 1M (4%)

Figure 3.3. Percentage of digital marketing strategies across list price ranges for ALL, SOLD,
and UNSOLD.
60

In addition to measuring the impact of the presence of a virtual tour (as opposed to a lack
of a virtual tour), the identifying feature populated in the data field in this MLS is a web link
indicating the specific domain name of the platform hosting the virtual tour; it provides an
opportunity to investigate the effects of particular platforms on market outcomes. Measuring the
impact of distinct platforms is valuable because not all virtual tours are created equal, and this
inquiry may illuminate distinctions in platform quality if these can be captured in the real estate
market outcome models.
Specified Virtual Tour Platforms
In a study on the impact of visual display of satellite images (and their quality) on sale
price and time-on-market, Benefield et al. (2012) suggest these images provide additional quality
information not available via MLS photos or virtual tours (e.g. size of a yard, proximity to
neighbors, etc.); despite the previous study’s assertion that virtual tours lacked in comparison to
satellite images, this current study seeks to bring the inquiry concerning quality property visuals
up to date as technological innovations have improved the visual quality and points of view of
photos and virtual tours over the past several years (e.g. the rise of commercial drone use in real
estate photography and videos). A sense of the quality may be determined by characteristics of
the virtual tour platform: whether it is a third-party site or uncertain (could be third-party or
agent-made virtual tour), pricing, musical accompaniment, and offerings of viewing perspectives
(e.g. aerial, 3-D, floor-plan, etc.).
The virtual tour platforms selected are the top three most frequently used in this data set
in order of frequency and include three third-party real estate marketing platforms and one wellknown social media platform, YouTube (even though it ranked 7th among platforms most
frequently used in the data set).
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Of the three virtual tour platforms that are third-party sites, two are U.S. nationally-based
companies; and one is a regional company working with agents across several southeast
counties; the last site, YouTube, is a popular social media video sharing site with a global
audience and is not a designated real estate marketing site. The first U.S. based company, Insta
Tour, claims to be the number one provider of virtual tours in the world in offering digital
marketing ease and expediency to MLS affiliated agents. Insta Tour boasts low cost virtual tours
($1.99 per tour) and minimal time investment and effort for the agents. Insta Tour accesses and
syncs with the agent’s MLS listing, and within an hour of the agent uploading photos of the
home into MLS (which is an MLS requirement for all property listings), Insta Tour generates
these photos into a “virtual tour”—a basic slide presentation of the agent’s uploaded photos that
are saved into video format; a link to the virtual tour (with the Insta Tour platform designation) is
then added back to the MLS listing. There is no musical accompaniment provided and an
average duration is indeterminable as the time of the slideshow depends on the number of MLS
photos submitted with the listing. The quality of the virtual tour photos and any additions to the
videos (music, aerial, 3D, panoramic, etc.) are entirely left to the agent. Insta Tour simply
generates the basic slide show video of static photos and whatever modifications to increase the
quality of the virtual tour afterwards are the agent’s responsibility. For additional fees, Insta Tour
offers to syndicate the virtual tour across social media platforms (including YouTube) and agent
websites.
In this sample, Virtual Views is the second national real estate marketing company
offering virtual tour and other marketing services to real estate agents; it claims to have over 350
trained and certified photographers across 45 U.S. states, who all use the same high-end
photography equipment to produce both still and panoramic photos for creating the virtual tours;
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there is no actual video footage or musical accompaniment. Slide-show virtual tour packages
advertised at $99.99. Upgrade services include adding audio tour guides ($24.99) and even
virtual staging (for vacant homes) that adds furniture into the photos of the rooms; however, no
other packaging prices are displayed.
Premier Pix Florida is a regionally based company and claims to be the number one real
estate photography company for three South Florida counties. Its offerings include detailed
depictions with video samples and transparent pricing of the following virtual tour services:
HDR Virtual Tour ($185) high dynamic range (HDR) photos with wide angle lens and highquality image filters, HDR Virtual Tour and HD Walk-through Video ($375), Full Motion HD
Walk-through Videos ($650), the Elite package option that includes professional narration of
video, 5-7 aerial views of neighborhood, community, water views, proximity to the ocean, golf
courses, and other amenities), and 3D Virtual Tours ($375-$575 depending on square footage)
made with Matterport camera equipment enabling viewing choice of “dollhouse” or floor plan,
and full-motion HD walk-through videos.
YouTube is the popular video-sharing site owned by Google; there is quite a variance in
the type of virtual tours agents upload to YouTube from do-it-yourself hand-held mobile phone
videos with voice narration to more professionally made videos created by third-party marketers
and syndicated across social sharing platforms. While YouTube does not necessarily have
consistent quality characteristics to discuss, including it in this study on the impact of virtual tour
platform choice on market outcomes is warranted, as it is the “top video research destination for
home shoppers” according to the 2013 collaborative report by Google and NAR. As of 2017,
YouTube ranks in the top eight platforms for real estate purposes with the highest percentage of
participation; it is also increasing in marketing potential for agents who are competing with real
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estate marketplace giants like Zillow, are already being heralded by real estate professionals for
its search engine optimization. The diversity of the over fifty All Other Virtual tour platforms
precludes this group from contributing meaningful insight into specific platform quality;
however, it is included as the baseline for the models and to account for the unspecified tour
platforms.

Figure 3.4. Virtual tour platforms: percentages across ALL, SOLD and UNSOLD.
As indicated earlier in Figure 3.1, VTs were used in 31% of ALL, 30% of SOLD, and
34% of UNSOLD properties. Figure 3.4 above shows the percentages of the specific platforms
used across ALL, SOLD and UNSOLD. The group All Other represents over half of the
percentages of VT and TPCxVT for ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD; however, this group is
comprised of a large variety (over fifty) of less recurring platforms quality distinctions are
difficult to ascertain. The most used platform, Insta Tour, represents the highest percentage of VT
(ALL with 23%; SOLD with 21%; UNSOLD with 39%). Virtual Views is the second largest VT
followed very closely by the third most represented platform, Premier Pix Florida (which
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consistently falls within between .3% – 1% of Virtual Views). YouTube represents between 2%
and 4% of the VTs across ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD. Insta Tour represents almost double the
percentage (21%) of VTs for SOLD over the next largest platforms.
The list price ranges can also be used to observe if virtual tours of any particular platform
are predominant in a specific listing price range. As seen in Figure 3.5 Virtual tour platforms:
percentages across list price ranges of ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD of the low list price range of
$125,000-$250,000, Insta Tour was the most used platform representing 45% of ALL properties
with VTs in that range, followed closely by All Other with 35%; it decreases in usage as list price
range increases to 23% for the mid list price range, 13% in the mid-high list price range and
9.2% of the high list price range. Virtual Views was represented equally in the low and mid
ranges at 11% and 11.5% respectively, and decreasingly lower as the list price increased from
9.5% in mid-high to 6% in the highest range.
Premier Pix increased across list price ranges almost doubling from the lowest at 7.4% to
15% in the highest range with mid at 9.7% and mid-high at 13% fairly. YouTube had a low use
rate across all list price ranges from 1.8% for the low, 3.5% for the mid to its highest percentage
of representation in the mid-high range at 5.4%, and a decrease in the high list price range at
2.8%.
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Figure 3.5.Virtual tour platforms across list price ranges of ALL, SOLD, and UNSOLD.
Apart from the All Other (which accounts for the highest occurrences of virtual tours
across all of the list price ranges), Insta Tour dominates the low and mid list price ranges for
SOLD properties with lesser presence in mid-high and high. Virtual Views is equally represented
across low, mid and mid-high list price ranges of SOLD homes with a decrease by almost half in
the high list price range. In the SOLD sample, Premier Pix, which is lower than both Insta Tour
and Virtual Views in the low and mid list price ranges, dominates the mid-high and high list
price ranges by nearly double its competitors. To summarize briefly, Insta Tour is the dominant
platform used in homes listed for up to $500,000 and ties with Premier Pix in the $500,000+ to
$750,000 list price homes with the latter having the greatest representation in homes listed
between $750,000+ and $1 M.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology and the most commonly used econometric
models in real estate literature for determining the impact of variables of interest on market
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outcomes. In this study, the hedonic pricing model, the duration model and the probability
model are deployed to examine the effects of digital marketing strategies on the sales price, timeon-market and probability of sale of single-family residences. The following sections provide a
discussion of each model and explanation of the equation used in this study.
OLS Hedonic Pricing Model
Housing is considered to be a heterogeneous good consisting of notably different
attributes from one another, and thus, the value of a property is made up of its individual
components. Rosen (1974) describes housing as a “bundle” of characteristics, where each
characteristic adds to the property’s total value. Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) extend
the analogy of housing as bag or “bundle” by likening it to a bag groceries: there are small,
medium, and large bags, and all include a variety of diverse items (each contributing to the
overall price of the entire bag). Whereas the individual prices for each particular grocery item is
easily determined, the price of individual housing characteristics cannot be directly observed;
however, by using the available data about the individual housing characteristics, a multiple
regression analysis can be used to estimate what, if any, marginal effect each feature (e.g.
number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, a pool, garage, or a water view) has on the overall
value of the home (Sirmans & Macpherson, 2003). The hedonic price model (HPM) can be used
to derive the implicit price or monetary value (provided by the regression estimates) of each
variable or individual feature in the bundle of characteristics by calculating and then observing
the differences in the sale price of houses with the same attributes (Melichar, Vojáček, Rieger &
Jedlička, 2004).18

18

Hedonic pricing models correlate the market price of the house with the physical property characteristics, location, etc. and allows a way to
ascertain a monetary value that each characteristic has by noting the differences in house prices of homes sharing the same attributes. With an
understanding that the home is defined by a heterogeneous set of attributes, the price paid for the purchased home is the sum of the price paid for
each of the home’s attributes or what is called the implicit price (Melichar et al., 2004)
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HPM is used to measure the value of the more evident home characteristics (e.g. physical
properties) as well as the effect of various factors of “special interest” concerning the home
(Sirmans & Macpherson, 2003). Examples of special interest factors previously considered for
their potential impact on a home’s sale price include being located in a gated community, the
property’s proximity to undesirable locations (landfill, hog farm, high voltage lines, flood or
earthquake zones, and industrial plants emitting air pollution) (Malpezzi, 2002; Sirmans,
Macpherson, & Zietz, 2005; Chang, Danpani, & Johnson, 2007; Currie et al., 2015). Marketing
efforts have also been explored with HPM (e.g. open houses, broker open houses, broker
comments, seller motivation, digital lock boxes, MLS photos, satellite images, virtual tours, etc.).
The dependent variable in the HPM is the sale price (SP) that stands as a proxy for the
property’s overall value. The housing attributes most frequently used as independent (control)
variables (although, not all are always included in every model)19 are often categorized into
variations of the following subsets (Sirmans & Macpherson, 2003; Xie, 2018):
1) Structural attributes: internal (age, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, half-bath, square
footage, stories, fireplace, central air-conditioning/heating, etc.) and external (pool,
garage, deck, etc.).
2) Location / Neighborhood features / Public Services: zip codes, distance to CBD
(Central Business District) or major employment facilities, amenities (shopping mall or
other public spaces), accessibility to major transportation hubs (train, bus, railway, and
subway stations, highways, and airports) / golf course, crime, economic and social
characteristics of neighborhood / school district, public sewer, etc.

19

In a compiled list of the twenty most frequently used characteristics for modeling hedonic pricing equations, property age is most frequently used,
followed by square footage (see Sirmans et al., 2005 for more in-depth examination of additional characteristics found in empirical studies using a
hedonic pricing model). Also see Table 3.3 Physical Property Characteristics used as Control Variables in Residential Real Estate Studies.
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3) Environmental features: Natural (e.g. water view, lake, ocean, aesthetic views) and
Quality (e.g. air, water and noise pollution; distance to recreational sites)
4) Market indicators: vacant, owner-occupied, Federal Funds Rate
5) Financing influences: favorable financing, VA, FHA, foreclosure, property taxes,
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Table 3.3. Physical Property Characteristics used as Control Variables in Residential Real
Estate Studies
Characteristic
Half-bath (at least one)

Fireplace

Pool

Golf Course

Source
Benefield & Hardin (2015); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012);
Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011); Chang, Dandipani & Johnson (2010); Waller, Brastow & Johnson
(2010); Goodwin, Johnson & Zumpano (2009); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007)
Allen et al. (2015); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012); Benefield, Cain
& Johnson (2011); Waller, Brastow & Johnson (2010); Goodwin, Johnson & Zumpano (2012); Johnson,
Zumpano & Anderson (2008); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007); Ford, Rutherford & Yates (2005);
Rutherford, Springer & Yavas (2005); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005); Anglin, Rutherford &
Springer (2003)
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Allen, Dare & LI (2017) Allen, Cadena & Rutherford (2015); Benefield
& Hardin (2015); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012); Chang,
Dandipani & Johnson (2010); Goodwin, Johnson & Zumpano (2012); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007);
Ford, Rutherford & Yates (2005); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005); Rutherford, Springer & Yavas
(2005); Anglin, Rutherford & Springer (2003)
Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012); Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011)

Walk-in closet
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016)
Brick
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012);
Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011)
Fenced Yard
Ceramic Tile / Hardwood /
Vinyl Siding
Separate shower from
bathtub
Wooded
Lot size

Number of Stories
Water Front / Water view
Garage / No Garage /# of
Car Garage
Carport / Driveway
Style (Ranch, Contemporary
or Traditional, Other etc.)
Separate Dining Area
Disposal in Kitchen

Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013)
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Waller, Brastow & Johnson (2010)
Zumpano & Anderson (2008); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005)
Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012)
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Allen, Dare & Li (2017); Allen et al. (2015); Waller, Brastow &
Johnson (2010); Rutherford, Springer & Yavas (2005); Anglin, Rutherford & Springer (2003)
Allen, Dare & Li (2017); Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Anglin, Rutherford & Springer (2003)
Allen, Dare & Li (2017); Benefield & Hardin (2015); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012); Benefield, Cain
& Johnson (2011);
Allen, Dare & Li (2017); Goodwin, Waller & Weeks (2013); Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012);
Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011); Goodwin, Johnson & Zumpano (2012); Johnson, Zumpano &
Anderson (2008); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005); Anglin,
Rutherford & Springer (2003)
Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011)
Benefield, Cain & Gleason (2012); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005)
Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005)

Crawlspace
Slab (built on)
Elevated or Basement /
Finished Basement
Garden Tub

Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011)
Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011)

Double Oven

Zumpano & Anderson (2008); Johnson, Benefield & Wiley (2007); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005)

Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016); Benefield, Cain & Johnson (2011) Waller, Brastow & Johnson (2010);
Goodwin, Johnson & Zumpano (2012); Johnson, Zumpano & Anderson (2008); Johnson, Benefield &
Wiley (2007); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005)

Well/ Septic
Bian, Waller & Wentland (2016)
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The following HPM used for this study includes relatively standard independent variables for
estimating the effects of the baseline model without the digital marketing variables (1a) is the
baseline model without any digital marketing variables; (1b) includes the separate variables of
interest denoting digital marketing strategies of TPC and VT (1c) includes the variable TPCxVT
while controlling for TPC and VT (1d), and separate TPC and each of the distinct VT platforms
holding all other control variables constant and regressing on the sale price of properties in this
sample:20
(1a)
lnSP = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi lnTOMi,)
(1b)
lnSP = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi lnTOMi, TPCi, VTi)
(1c)
lnSP = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi lnTOMi, TPCi, VTi, TPCxVTi,)
(1d)
lnSP = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnTOMi TPCi, INSTATOURi, VIRTVIEWSi, PREMPIXi
YouTubei,)
In each of (1a) through (1d) the dependent variable lnSP is the natural log21 of the sale
price for each observation (residential property). While there is ongoing discussion among
researchers employing HPM about the specifications of the functional forms to be used (Reis &
Silva, 2006), the log-log functional form, sometimes referred to as double-log, is one generally

20

The purpose of considering VT as a separate variable in 1b is to enable a discussion of the results with previous research reporting on VT as a
distinct predictor variable in the models.
In the context of linear regression in the social sciences, Gelman and Hill (2007) show a preference for natural logs because “coefficients on
the natural-log scale are directly interpretable as approximate proportional differences: with a coefficient of 0.06, a difference of 1 in xx
corresponds to an approximate 6% difference in yy”(p.60-61).
21
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used in HPM of real estate studies. Logging both the Sale Price (Y) and some of the independent
X variables (e.g. age, square footage, time-on-market as demonstrated in Benefield et al., 2012)
allows us to account for the elasticity of price with respect to the other independent variables and
more readily interpret the estimated coefficients as the ceteris paribus22 percentage change
(increase or decrease) in price (Y) for a percentage change in the given variables (X) (Woodridge,
2000; Gelman & Hill, 2007).
Xi represents a vector of structural and environmental property characteristics depicting
the physical property characteristics and natural view of the property. Li is a vector of location
control variables (identified by specific zip codes numbered 1-51); Mi is the vector of a set of
variables representing the market indicators (VACANT) and (FFR); TOMi is the time-on-market
as explained previously, and finally, the digital marketing variable of interest is represented by
the following in each equation:
(1b-2b) TPC if the property has the digital marketing strategy
of Third-party Commentary and VT if it has a Virtual Tour.

(1c-2c) TPC xVT if the property has the combined digital marketing strategies
of both Third-party commentary and a Virtual Tour

(1d-2d) TPC if the property has the separate strategies of TPC and INSTATOUR,
VIRTVIEWS, PREMPIX, and YouTube, as one of the four particular VT Platforms

22

Ceteris paribus (all else held constant).
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OLS Time-on-Market Model
In addition to the well-established metric of property price, time-on-market is the other
most utilized for depicting real estate property transactions and for providing analysis of the
effects of added or updated property features, agent/seller contract agreements, and marketing
strategies (Benefield & Hardin, 2015). Just as discussions over the most appropriate econometric
model to use in hedonic pricing equations abound, so too do debates emerge in time-on-market
analyses.23 In an assessment of time-on-market studies published between 1974 and 2013
(specifically ones that use time-on-market as a dependent variable), Koch and Maier (2015)
identify OLS modeling as one of the most common methods appearing in 23 of the 51 articles
included. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate time-on-market is a technique used by
recent researchers (Allen et al., 2015; Benefield & Hardin, 2015)24 and is used in this study’s
time-on-market model. As previously described, TOM is calculated by subtracting the contract
date (closing) from the initial list date for the successes (SOLD) and from the expired or
withdrawn date for those that failed to transact (UNSOLD). In each of Equations (2a - 2d) the
dependent variable lnTOM is the natural log of the time-on-market for each observation
(residential property).25
This model regresses TOM against the same property attributes used in the OLS Hedonic
Pricing Model, but instead uses the sale price (SP) as one of the explanatory variables. Just as in
the previous equation, Xi represents a vector of structural and environmental property
characteristics depicting the physical property characteristics and natural view of the property. Li

23

See Kiefer, (1998); Asabere, Huffman, & Mehdian, (1993); Yavas, (1994); and Jud, Seaks, & Winkler, (1996).

24

See Gordon et al. (2002) for studies that model property marketing time via ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation: e.g. Belkin, Hempel and
McLeavy (1976), Janssen and Jobson (1980), Asabere, Huffman and Mehdian (1993), and Allen, Faircloth, Forgey and Rutherford (2000).
25

See Allen et al. (2015) for using the natural log of time-on-market dependent variable.
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is a vector of location control variables (identified by specific ZIPS 1-51); Mi is the vector of a
set of variables representing the market indicators (VACANT) and (FFR); and finally, the digital
marketing variables of interest are represented by the following in each equation:

(2a)
lnTOMi = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnSPi,)
(2b)
lnTOMi = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnSPi, TPCi, VTi)
(2c)
lnTOMi = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi lnSPi, TPCi, VTi, TPCxVTsi)
(2d)
lnTOMi = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnSPi, TPCi, INSTATOURi, VIRTVIEWSi, PREMPIXi,
YouTubei)
Probability of Sale Model
For a little over a decade now, since Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2007) developed the
first empirical model to estimate the probability of a transaction occurring during a given
marketing period, real estate studies regularly add this third metric when investigating influences
on market outcomes. Refuting the previously held assumption that the relationship between sale
price and time-on-market was positive, Johnson et al. (2007) identify inconsistency in the results
as 76 of the 105 (72%) empirical estimations on property price and property marketing time
report findings that do not conform to the assumed relationship. The probability of sale can be
used to estimate the likelihood of making a buyer and seller match or stated simply, it is a helpful
analytical measure of the likelihood of a successful transaction occurring during a given
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marketing period and has become standard in real estate studies. It takes advantage of using the
entire data set of properties instead of only the subset of those that have successfully transacted.
The argument for modeling for probability of sale (in addition to the sales price and duration
models) is that it provides additional valuable information concerning property marketability and
agreement of property characteristic valuations between buyers and sellers and may quite
possibly offer distinct information not available in the pricing or time-on-market models
(Goodwin, Johnson, & Zumpano, 2012).26 Previous studies have used either probit or logit
specifications, and in some instances both, to analyze the effects of the selected variables of
interest in the study on the probability of a successful transaction.27 The specifications used in
this study’s model is patterned after Johnson et al. (2007), Benefield and Sirmans (2009), and
Brastow et al. (2012), who use logit specifications with the dependent variable SOLD
constructed as a binary dummy variable and given a value of 1 if the transacted (is a success) or
0 if the property failed to transact (unsuccessful). The following models are used to examine the
impact of digital marketing strategies on the probability of sale of the homes in the sample:

(3a)

Prob(SOLD) = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnTOMi)

(3b)

Prob(SOLD) = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnTOMi, TPCi, VTi)

(3c)

Prob(SOLD) = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnTOMi, TPCi, VTi, TPCxVTi)

Johnson et al., (2007) and Goodwin et al. (2012) build on Zuehlke (1987), who identifies a potential “delinking” of the three metrics due to
disparate property characteristic valuations among sellers and buyers, and on Anglin’s (2006) concern with a market instability effect on duration
estimations.
26

27

Studies using probit specifications include Allen, Dare and Li (2017), Rutherford and Yavas (2012), and Jin and Pathak (2010). Allen et al.
(2015) uses both probit and logit.
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(3d)

Prob(SOLD) = Ω (Xi, Li, Mi, lnTOMi, TPCi, INSTATOURi, VIRTVIEWSi,
PREMPIXi, YouTubei)
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CHAPTER FOUR:
FINDINGS
In this chapter, the results from the three econometric models are discussed to ascertain if
any significant relationship exists between the market outcomes of sales price, time-on-market,
and probability of sale and the digital marketing decisions to allow third-party commentary, to
use a virtual tour, to combine the two digital marketing strategies, or to use a particular virtual
tour platform to market a property.
OLS Hedonic Pricing Model Results
Characteristics most frequently included in hedonic pricing models, such as square
footage, age, number of beds, number of bathrooms, rooms, pool, water view, roof type, and
time on the market, generally have an expected positive sign, although sometimes, not all are
significant. While the results of hedonic pricing models are generally location specific and
difficult to generalize across different geographies, comparing studies across areas helps to
establish those characteristics that are consistently valued (positively or negatively) by
homebuyers. For example, larger homes (those with more square footage) typically sell for
higher prices, while older homes typically sell for less money in most areas.
Table 4.1, the hedonic pricing model regression, provides the results for all four
models (1a-1d). The coefficients for square footage signs positive and significant as expected;
the estimated coefficients for age also comply with expectations as they are significant and
negative across 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, which corresponds to the general expectations that an increase
in square footage increases the sale price by roughly 58% while age of the home decreases the
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sales price (e.g. at roughly by about 8%). A higher number of bedrooms increases price by
approximately 8% and a higher number of full bathrooms (approximately between 11.5 and
11.7%), and the presence of a half-bath (increasing the sales price by an estimated 2%) are all
significant and contribute to an increase in sales price. Homes with pools see an approximate
increase of 13.7% in sale price across all three equations, and those with a water view have
approximately an 8% increase in sale price; both amenities are widely accepted as having
positive price effects. Comparatively these amenities have a higher price effect than other studies
with pool at 7.1% and waterfront 6.2% in Allen et al. (2017) and with pool at 7% (Benefield &
Morgan, 2013) and with water view increase at 3.6%.
A Spanish tiled roof has an approximate range of 2.7% - 3% positive price effect, while
vacancy signs negative suggesting that a vacant home results in roughly a 6% decrease in sale
price. This is higher than price effects noted by Benefield and Morgan (2013) whose negative
price effect for vacant homes is reported at a 2% decrease in price. The Federal Funds Rate
(FFR) as a control variable proxying for the “cost” of credit, signs positive and significant, and
suggests buyer awareness of steadily increasing FFR and their willingness to pay a higher price
to lock into a home purchase before rates get even higher.
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Table 4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model Results.
Hedonic Pricing Model results with the following model specifications: (1a) No Digital Marketing (Baseline) (1b) Separate Digital Marketing (Third-party
Comments and Virtual Tour) (1c) Combined (both Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour); (1d) Separate by Platforms (Controlling for Third-party Comments
and Properties with Platform designated Virtual Tour).
Dependent Variable: Log of Sale Price

(1a)

Variable

Coefficient

CONSTANT

7.046***

(1b)
t

Coefficient
22.39

(1c)
t

Coefficient

7.0824***

22.53

7.0831***

(1d)
t

Coefficient

t

22.53

7.0794***

22.53

-0.0037

-0.48

-0.0454***

-3.99

0.0158

1.08

PREMIER PIX

0.075***

5.16

YOUTUBE

0.0575**

2.36

1.45

0.0089**

2.01

THIRD-PARTY COMMENTS (TPC)

0.0108

1.42

0.0011

0.11

VIRTUAL TOUR (VT)

0.0348***

5.92

0.0162

1.16

0.0224

1.46

TPCxVT
INSTA TOUR
VIRTUAL VIEWS

lnTOM

0.0086*

1.94

0.0065

1.46

lnTSXFT

0.5814***

43.7

0.578***

lnAGE

-0.0796***

lnBEDS

0.0819***

5.49

0.0825***

5.53

lnFull Baths

0.1172***

7.82

0.1153***

HALF-BATHS

0.0222**

3.23

POOL

0.1379***

WATERVIEW

0.0064

43.44

0.5778***

43.42

0.5763***

43.31

-15.85

-0.0787***

-15.83

-0.0788***

-15.84

0.0826***

5.54

0.083***

5.57

7.7

0.1154***

7.7

0.1169***

7.81

0.0217**

3.16

0.0218**

3.18

0.0229**

3.34

22.33

0.1372***

22.24

0.1372***

22.24

0.1371***

22.24

0.0791***

12.45

0.08***

12.6

0.0796***

12.53

0.076***

11.91

SPANISH TILE

0.0303***

4.31

0.0277***

3.93

0.0278***

3.94

0.0306***

4.36

VACANT

-0.0638***

-9.85

-0.0623***

-9.61

-0.0618***

-9.51

-0.0585***

-8.94

FEDERAL FUNDS RATE

0.2385***

3.54

0.233**

0.2338**

3.47

0.2407***

3.57

zip1

1.0078

3.36

0.9905

3.31

0.9989

3.34

1.0109

3.38

zip2

0.7895

2.64

0.7711

2.58

0.7804

2.62

0.7882

2.64

-16.01

-0.0788***
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3.46

Table 4.1 Continued
zip3

0.9613

3.22

0.9423

3.16

zip4

1.1714

3.94

1.1538

3.89

zip5

0.911

3.07

0.8942

zip6

0.7863

2.64

zip7

1.2418

zip8

3.19

0.9572

3.22

1.1621

3.91

1.1698

3.94

3.01

0.9032

3.04

0.911

3.07

0.7707

2.59

0.7795

2.62

0.7894

2.66

4.18

1.2205

4.11

1.2289

4.14

1.2374

4.17

0.7846

2.64

0.7689

2.59

0.777

2.62

0.7859

2.65

zip9

1.0926

3.68

1.0733

3.62

1.0819

3.65

1.0915

3.68

zip10

0.8362

2.82

0.8176

2.76

0.8266

2.79

0.8387

2.83

zip11

0.8271

2.79

0.8109

2.73

0.8199

2.76

0.8319

2.81

zip12

0.7285

2.45

0.7102

2.39

0.719

2.42

0.7293

2.46

zip13

0.9082

3.06

0.8905

3.01

0.899

3.03

0.9108

3.08

zip14

0.7828

2.63

0.7655

2.58

0.7743

2.61

0.7828

2.64

zip15

0.7089

2.38

0.6902

2.32

0.6988

2.35

0.711

2.39

zip16

1.0896

3.67

1.066

3.6

1.0743

3.62

1.091

3.68

zip17

0.7981

2.69

0.7784

2.62

0.7869

2.65

0.7984

2.69

zip18

0.9403

3.17

0.9166

3.09

0.9258

3.12

0.951

3.21

zip19

0.4326

1.42

0.4219

1.39

0.4289

1.41

0.4378

1.44

zip20

1.2167

4.09

1.196

4.03

1.2055

4.06

1.2223

4.12

zip21

1.3564

4.55

1.3352

4.49

1.3445

4.52

1.3623

4.58

zip22

1.0849

3.66

1.063

3.59

1.0723

3.62

1.094

3.69

zip23

1.0967

3.69

1.0731

3.61

1.0826

3.65

1.1071

3.73

zip24

0.9313

3.13

0.911

3.07

0.9202

3.1

0.935

3.15

zip25

0.8537

2.88

0.8346

2.82

0.8433

2.85

0.8577

2.9

zip26

0.8962

3.02

0.8758

2.96

0.8843

2.98

0.8996

3.04

zip27

0

zip28

1.1754

0
3.95

0.9507

0

1.1555
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3.89

1.1648

0
3.92

1.1792

3.97

Table 4.1 Continued
zip29

0.965

3.25

0.9445

3.19

0.9532

3.21

0.9708

3.28

zip30

1.0261

3.46

1.0026

3.38

1.011

3.41

1.0283

3.47

zip31

0.8192

2.76

0.7995

2.69

0.8089

2.72

0.8236

2.77

zip32

1.1163

3.76

1.0945

3.69

1.1031

3.72

1.1123

3.76

zip33

0.9648

3.25

0.9456

3.19

0.954

3.22

0.9638

3.25

zip34

0.8109

2.73

0.7915

2.67

0.8004

2.7

0.8117

2.74

zip35

0.8475

2.85

0.8288

2.79

0.8375

2.82

0.847

2.86

zip36

0.8043

2.71

0.7857

2.65

0.7941

2.68

0.8058

2.72

zip37

0.8747

2.95

0.8552

2.89

0.864

2.92

0.876

2.96

zip38

1.1902

4

1.1714

3.94

1.18

3.97

1.1899

4.01

zip39

0.8628

2.91

0.8455

2.85

0.8541

2.88

0.8638

2.92

zip40

0.8364

2.82

0.8162

2.75

0.8246

2.78

0.8413

2.84

zip41

1.0189

3.42

0.9966

3.35

1.0051

3.38

1.021

3.44

zip42

-0.1106

-0.26

-0.1079

-0.26

-0.1078

-0.26

-0.1082

-0.26

zip43

1.4654

4.92

1.4449

4.86

1.4533

4.88

1.4588

4.91

zip44

1.0476

3.53

1.0262

3.46

1.0346

3.49

1.0461

3.53

zip45

1.445

4.81

1.4239

4.75

1.4338

4.78

1.4496

4.84

zip46

0.8541

2.87

0.8345

2.81

0.8426

2.84

0.8593

2.89

zip47

1.2518

4.22

1.2297

4.15

1.2389

4.18

1.257

4.24

zip48

1.1793

3.97

1.161

3.91

1.1699

3.94

1.1816

3.98

zip49

0.2896

0.8

0.2611

0.72

0.2692

0.74

0.2945

0.81

zip50

0.9431

3.17

0.9222

3.11

0.9307

3.14

0.9495

3.2

zip51

0.9498

3.2

0.9266

3.12

0.9359

3.15

0.9576

3.23

Notes: For the log of sale price regression results above, all models were estimated with OLS. For 1d, the baseline omitted for the multi-class categorical variable of virtual tour
platform is “ALLOTHERVT” in the coding system. R2 and Adj.R2 1a. 58.94% and 58.75%; 1b. 59.05% and 58.85%; 1c. 59.06% and 58.86%; 1d. 59.10% and 58.89%.
N= 13,088; ***, **, *, denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively or p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1
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Turning to the variables of interest, the results from the regression analysis show that
home sale prices are generally positively related to the digital marketing variable of virtual tours
(VT) but not for third-party comments (TPC), which is not significant in any of the models (1b,
1c, or 1d). The estimated coefficient for virtual tours (VT) (.0348) is positive and significant
suggesting that having a virtual tour has a positive price effect of approximately 3.5%. These
findings sign consistently with previous positive pricing results for virtual tours (2.1% in Carillo
2008; Benefield, Cain & Gleason, 2012); 4.0% (Allen et al., 2015), and 7.4% (Allen, et al.,
2017).
As shown in the results of 1c, choosing both to use both marketing strategies as described
in the combined variable of TPCxVT, is not significant, thus, allowing third-party comments
alone or with a virtual tour does not yield a significant finding. Using TPC as a control variable
in 1d, there are significant results when properties use specific virtual tour platforms. Of the
specific platforms investigated, Insta Tour is statistically significant, but has a negative price
effect of approximately -4.5%. Premier Pix, FL on the other hand is both significant and positive
with an estimated 7.5% price effect. YouTube is also significant and positive with an
approximate price increase of 5.8%. Again, given the average home price from the sample is
approximately $350, 000, the coefficients for the specific virtual tour platform suggest the
following increases or decreases in selling price: Insta Tour results in a loss of approximately
$15, 750 for the seller while the agent’s commission is only reduced by around less than $500.
On the other hand, Premier Pix benefits the seller by an approximate increase of $26, 250 with
the agent compensation increasing by close to $800. YouTube also has a beneficial increase for
the seller at approximately $20, 300 with additional agent earnings of about $600. Choosing
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Insta Tour as the virtual tour platform is clearly not in the best interest of the seller even as it
does not have a major negative impact on agent compensation; as the least expensive virtual tour
(as well as requiring the least time investment), defaulting to this platform for homes under $500,
000 (those in the low and mid price ranges) fits along with previous assertions that agent
marketing efforts are highly motivated by pay off (even at the expense of the seller).
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OLS Time-on-Market Model Results
Estimated coefficients on the time-on-market variable tend to vary considerably across
reported studies (Sirmans et al., 2010). In a comprehensive review of prior research in the timeon-market literature that includes empirical analyses, Benefield et al., (2013) find considerable
variability in time-on-market coefficients and ambiguous findings; for example, sales price as a
predictor of time-on-market could be positive (as in 89 models), negative (as in 76 models) or
entirely unrelated (as insignificant in 86 models).
In the time-on-market regression results for this study, sale price is a positive and
significant predictor of marketing duration with an estimated coefficient of (.033). The estimated
coefficients for the property characteristics in time on the market in this analysis indicate that the
larger the home is, the longer the marketing period with estimated coefficients across all models
for square footage showing a 16.8% increase or an additional 16 days (given the average timeon-market for SOLD homes is 95 days). While the number of beds is not significant, the number
of full bathrooms shows an increase of approximately 10% or just over 9 days and half-baths
approximately 4.5% (or 5 days). The age of the home is significant and negative indicating a
reduction in marketing time by 5.5-5.6% (by roughly 6 days). Having a pool is significant and
negative and reduces marketing time by about 4% ( or approximately 4 days), while for those
homes with a water view, the coefficients are significant and positive with an increase of
between 3.1-3.7% (.6% jump ascribed to presence of digital marketing when compared to the
baseline of 2a; results in an additional 3.5 days). Vacant homes are not significant in any of the
models 2a-2d; previous studies found vacancy increases marketing time (at 4.9% in Benefield &
Morgan, 2013) Again, Federal Funds Rate is significant and on average decreases the marketing
time span; this suggests that as the rates are rising, buyers are more apt to make purchases more
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quickly to lock into the rate so homes are selling faster before the costs of the credit increase. As
Goodwin et al. (2012) suggests buyers may be more apt to complete a transaction (“close the
deal”) before rates start to rise again and possibly increase their costs to borrow.
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Table 4.2 Time-on-Market OLS Regression Results.
Time-on-market OLS results with the following model specifications: (2a) No Digital Marketing (Baseline) (2b) Separate Digital Marketing (Third-party
Comments and Virtual Tour) (2c) Combined (both Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour); (2d) Separate by Platforms (Controlling for Third-party Comments
and Properties with Platform designated Virtual Tour).

Dependent Variable:
Log of Time-on-Market

Variables
CONSTANT

(2a)

(2b)

Coefficient
3.34***

t

(2c)

Coefficient
5.28

t

(2d)

Coefficient

t

Coefficient

t

3.513***

5.57

3.5143***

5.57

3.3304***

5.26

-0.0217

-1.45

-0.0285

-1.43

-0.0296*

-1.93

0.1093***

9.47

0.0963***

3.49

0.0157

0.52

INSTA TOUR

0.0772***

3.43

VIRTUAL VIEWS

0.0799***

2.78

0.0289

1

-0.0038

-0.08

THIRD-PARTY COMMENTS (TPC)
VIRTUAL TOUR (VT)
TPCxVT

PREMIER PIX
YOUTUBE
lnSP

0.0336*

1.94

0.0252

1.46

0.0251

1.45

0.0348**

2.01

lnTSXFT

0.1738***

6.18

0.1639***

5.85

0.1638***

5.84

0.1729***

6.15

lnAGE

-0.056***

-5.65

-0.0547***

-5.53

-0.0546***

-5.53

-0.055***

-5.55

-0.0147

-0.5

-0.0082

-0.28

-0.0081

-0.28

-0.0151

-0.51

lnFull Baths

0.1122***

3.78

0.1071***

3.62

0.1071***

3.62

0.1132***

3.82

HALF-BATHS

0.0464***

3.43

0.0458***

3.39

0.0459***

3.4

0.0472***

3.48

-0.0419***

-3.37

-0.0422***

-3.41

-0.0422***

-3.41

-0.0419***

-3.37

0.0312**

2.47

0.0358***

2.84

0.0355***

2.82

0.037***

2.92

SPANISH TILE

0.0138

0.99

0.0049

0.35

0.005

0.36

0.0127

0.92

VACANT

0.0155

1.2

0.0189

1.47

0.0192

1.5

0.0109

0.84

lnBEDS

POOL
WATERVIEW
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FEDERAL FUNDS RATE

-1.4158***

-10.66

-1.4209***

-10.74

-1.4203***

-10.74

-1.421***

-10.71

0.0756

0.13

0.079

0.13

0.085

0.14

0.0969

0.16

zip2

0.0599

0.1

0.0575

0.1

0.0641

0.11

0.0833

0.14

zip3

-0.0159

-0.03

-0.0159

-0.03

-0.0099

-0.02

0.0072

0.01

zip4

0.0587

0.1

0.061

0.1

0.0669

0.11

0.0834

0.14

zip5

0.0039

0.01

0.0054

0.01

0.0119

0.02

0.0243

0.04

zip6

-0.0283

-0.05

-0.0206

-0.04

-0.0143

-0.02

-0.003

-0.01

zip7

0.0194

0.03

0.011

0.02

0.017

0.03

0.0406

0.07

zip8

-0.0172

-0.03

-0.0162

-0.03

-0.0104

-0.02

0.0043

0.01

zip9

-0.0488

-0.08

-0.055

-0.09

-0.0489

-0.08

-0.0285

-0.05

zip10

-0.16

-0.27

-0.1648

-0.28

-0.1583

-0.27

-0.1406

-0.24

zip11

-0.0945

-0.16

-0.0914

-0.16

-0.085

-0.15

-0.075

-0.13

zip12

-0.1322

-0.23

-0.137

-0.23

-0.1307

-0.22

-0.1146

-0.2

zip13

-0.2274

-0.39

-0.2287

-0.39

-0.2227

-0.38

-0.209

-0.36

zip14

-0.1344

-0.23

-0.1356

-0.23

-0.1293

-0.22

-0.1146

-0.2

zip15

-0.1045

-0.18

-0.1122

-0.19

-0.1061

-0.18

-0.0853

-0.15

zip16

-0.0243

-0.04

-0.0406

-0.07

-0.0347

-0.06

-0.0037

-0.01

zip17

0.0306

0.05

0.0194

0.03

0.0254

0.04

0.0465

0.08

zip18

-0.1205

-0.21

-0.1439

-0.25

-0.1374

-0.23

-0.1166

-0.2

zip19

0.1253

0.21

0.1206

0.2

0.1254

0.21

0.1326

0.22

zip20

-0.0778

-0.13

-0.0879

-0.15

-0.0812

-0.14

-0.0656

-0.11

zip21

-0.0661

-0.11

-0.0778

-0.13

-0.0711

-0.12

-0.0575

-0.1

zip22

-0.1162

-0.2

-0.1333

-0.23

-0.1267

-0.22

-0.1083

-0.18

zip23

-0.1215

-0.21

-0.1441

-0.25

-0.1373

-0.23

-0.1146

-0.2

zip24

-0.006

-0.01

-0.0199

-0.03

-0.0134

-0.02

0.0066

0.01

zip25

-0.1114

-0.19

-0.1183

-0.2

-0.1121

-0.19

-0.0947

-0.16

zip26

-0.0342

-0.06

-0.0474

-0.08

-0.0414

-0.07

-0.021

-0.04

zip27

0

zip1
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0

0

zip28

0.0666

0.11

0.0587

0.1

0.0652

0.11

0.083

0.14

zip29

-0.0438

-0.07

-0.0551

-0.09

-0.0489

-0.08

-0.0292

-0.05

zip30

0.0976

0.17

0.0778

0.13

0.0837

0.14

0.1072

0.18

zip31

-0.0977

-0.17

-0.1091

-0.19

-0.1024

-0.17

-0.0893

-0.15

zip32

-0.1413

-0.24

-0.1535

-0.26

-0.1474

-0.25

-0.12

-0.2

zip33

0.0459

0.08

0.0415

0.07

0.0475

0.08

0.0689

0.12

zip34

0.0051

0.01

-0.0005

0

0.0058

0.01

0.026

0.04

zip35

-0.1184

-0.2

-0.1221

-0.21

-0.1159

-0.2

-0.0977

-0.17

zip36

-0.1362

-0.23

-0.1416

-0.24

-0.1355

-0.23

-0.1172

-0.2

zip37

-0.1196

-0.2

-0.127

-0.22

-0.1207

-0.21

-0.1021

-0.17

zip38

-0.1527

-0.26

-0.1518

-0.26

-0.1457

-0.25

-0.1294

-0.22

zip39

-0.1766

-0.3

-0.1766

-0.3

-0.1705

-0.29

-0.1561

-0.27

zip40

-0.0853

-0.15

-0.0976

-0.17

-0.0916

-0.16

-0.0728

-0.12

zip41

0.0379

0.06

0.0235

0.04

0.0296

0.05

0.0409

0.07

zip42

0.0518

0.06

0.0588

0.07

0.0589

0.07

0.0516

0.06

zip43

-0.1559

-0.26

-0.1623

-0.28

-0.1562

-0.27

-0.137

-0.23

zip44

-0.0789

-0.13

-0.0891

-0.15

-0.0831

-0.14

-0.0552

-0.09

zip45

0.0695

0.12

0.0592

0.1

0.0663

0.11

0.083

0.14

zip46

-0.0281

-0.05

-0.0411

-0.07

-0.0354

-0.06

-0.0128

-0.02

zip47

-0.0927

-0.16

-0.1052

-0.18

-0.0986

-0.17

-0.0797

-0.14

zip48

-0.0222

-0.04

-0.0273

-0.05

-0.021

-0.04

-0.0043

-0.01

zip49

0.3948

0.55

0.3583

0.5

0.364

0.51

0.4219

0.59

zip50

0.0225

0.04

0.0095

0.02

0.0156

0.03

0.0344

0.06

zip51

-0.0111

-0.02

-0.0342

-0.06

-0.0276

-0.05

0.0004

0
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Notes: For the log of time-on-market regression results above, all models were estimated with OLS. For 2d, the baseline omitted for the multi-class categorical variable of virtual
tour platform is “ALLOTHERVT” in the coding system. R2 and Adj.R2 2a. 6.01% and 5.57%; 2b. 6.71% and 6.26%; 2c. 6.71% and 6.25%; 2d. 6.2% and 5.73%.
N=13,088; ***, **, *, denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively or p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1.; no zip codes are significant in this model.
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For the digital marketing results, as hypothesized, using a virtual tour as opposed to not
using one is significant and extends the time on the market by an average of between 9.6 % -11%
or by roughly between 9 and 11 days. Previous studies have variation in their results with Virtual
Tours: reduced time-on-market by 1% (Allen et al., 2017) and increased marketing time by 15%
(Benefield, Cain & Gleason, 2012).
Combining both digital marketing strategies is again not significant. However, the
specific virtual tour regressions results reveal that TPC is significant and negative when used as a
control variable (reducing days on the market by roughly 2.9% or about 3 days). Of the two
virtual tour platforms that are significant, Virtual Views shows the greatest increases in
marketing span by about 8% (roughly 8 days), followed closely by Insta Tour, which also
extends marketing time by approximately 7.7% (approximately 8 days). Premier Pix and
YouTube are not significant.
Probability of Sale Results
As noted, probability of sale and time-on-market have an inverse relationship; the longer
the time that a property is on the market, assuming consistency in marketing conditions, the less
favorably buyers will perceive the property’s value; thus, a longer marketing time is expected to
cause a lower likelihood of selling the property within the given marketing period (Johnson et
al., 2007). According to Chang, Dandipani, and Johnson (2010), the relationship between timeon-market and SOLD properties should be negative and statistically significant. In the results of
the logit model used in this study, reported in Table 4.3 in the results of the Probability of Sale
analysis, time-on-market signs appropriately in that it is statistically significant and negative with
a reported odds ratio is between .13 and .14 across all models 3a-3d.
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According to Change, Danipani & Johnson (2010) studies on which property attributes
affect the probability that a property will sell lack consistency. Also shown in Table 4.5, the age
of a home signs negative as does having a higher number of full bathrooms, and having a halfbathroom; thus, holding all other variables constant, the odds of selling an older properties, ones
with more full bathrooms, or ones a half-bathroom are less than the odds of selling a property
that is newer, one that has fewer full bathrooms and no half-bath. Having a pool is significant
and increases the probability of selling the property in the given marketing period by (the odds of
selling a home with a pool is between 1.13 and 1.4 times larger than the odds of selling a home
without a pool); water view is significant and also increases the likelihood of sale between 1.1
and 1.2. A vacant property is significant and increases the likelihood of successful transaction
with the odds of selling a vacant home 1.4 – 1.6 larger than selling a home that is not vacant;
having a Spanish tile roof is not significant.
Since this study hypothesizes that using digital marketing strategies will increase arrival
rates (buyer offers) leading to a greater likelihood of sale, the expectation, holding all other
variables constant, is that allowing third-party comments and using virtual tours will all be
significant and increase the likelihood of a successful transaction. Previous probability of sale
studies that include virtual tours report an increased likelihood of sale: Allen et al. (2015) with a
reported 1.306 odds ratio. Virtual tours increase the probability of the seller receiving an offer
(Fowler et al., 2018).
Almost all of the digital marketing variables of interest are significant and positive: In
(3b) TPC is 1.32 and VT is positive at the 5% level with 1.16 reported odds ratio. In (3c) TPC is
still significant (at the 5% level) with 1.25 odds ratio, but VT is not and neither is combining both
marketing strategies, TPCxVT.
90

Properties marketed with specific digital marketing platforms are all significant except
for YouTube; TPC is not significant either in (3d). Insta Tour is negative with a reported odds
ratio of .49, indicating that the odds of selling a property with this virtual tour platform is .49
times less likely than the odds of selling a property that does use this virtual tour platform. VT is
also positive and significant with a reported odds ratio of 1.16.
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Table 4.3 Probability of Sale with Logit Regression.
(3a) Baseline – no digital marketing (3b) Third-party Comments and Virtual Tour separate (3c) Third-party Comments and Virtual
Tour separate combined variable (TPCxVT) (3d) Specified Virtual Tour Platforms (controlling for Third-Party Comments).
Dependent Variable: SOLD

(3a)

Variable

Odds Ratio

CONSTANT

695644.1***

(3b)

(3c)

z

Odds Ratio

z

11.47

572289.5***

TPC
VIRTUAL TOUR (VT)

(3d)

Odds Ratio

z

Odds Ratio

z

11.27

612574.2***

11.3

986499.7***

11.66

1.3288***

3.8

1.2503**

2.2

1.1

1.22

1.1596**

2.4

1.0409

0.3

1.1452

0.9

INSTA TOUR

0.4945***

-7.17

VIRTUAL VIEWS

1.7693***

3.19

PREMIER PIX

1.879***

3.25

YOUTUBE

1.3422

0.95

TPCxVT

lnTOM

0.1388***

-33.8

0.1383***

-33.76

0.1383***

-33.76

0.1402***

-33.42

lnTSXFT

0.8744

-0.93

0.8674

-0.99

0.8664

-1

0.8307

-1.28

lnAGE

0.8434***

-3.27

0.8497***

-3.12

0.8502***

-3.11

0.8608***

-2.84

lnBEDS

0.8738

-0.84

0.8695

-0.87

0.8704

-0.86

0.9121

-0.57

lnFull Baths

0.6707**

-2.54

0.6636***

-2.6

0.6623***

-2.61

0.6571***

-2.65

HALF-BATHS

0.7741***

-3.68

0.7686***

-3.78

0.7693***

-3.76

0.7748***

-3.64

POOL

1.1409*

1.96

1.1365*

1.9

1.1361*

1.9

1.134*

1.86

WATERVIEW

1.2342***

3.08

1.2314***

3.04

1.2286***

3

1.1483**

1.99

SPANISH TILE

1.0668

0.9

1.0588

0.79

1.0588

0.79

1.0844

1.12

VACANT

1.4187***

4.56

1.429***

4.64

1.434***

4.68

1.5553***

5.65

FEDERAL FUNDS RATE

2.4453

1.02

2.3219

0.96

2.3226

0.96

2.1932

0.89

zip1

0.3276

-2.69

0.3189

-2.75

0.3178

-2.76

0.2867

-2.99

zip2

0.4828

-1.77

0.4884

-1.74

0.4876

-1.74

0.4105

-2.15

zip3

0.9923

-0.02

0.9737

-0.06

0.9668

-0.07

0.8045

-0.47
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zip4

0.3966

-3.24

0.3965

-3.24

0.3935

-3.26

0.3355

-3.79

zip5

1.0749

0.2

1.0872

0.23

1.0833

0.22

0.9013

-0.28

zip6

0.884

-0.33

0.897

-0.29

0.8923

-0.3

0.7481

-0.77

zip7

1.8409

1.42

1.7895

1.36

1.773

1.33

1.4709

0.9

zip8

0.7466

-0.87

0.7788

-0.74

0.7685

-0.78

0.6434

-1.3

zip9

0.6959

-1.38

0.7003

-1.36

0.6954

-1.38

0.5999

-1.93

zip10

0.7052

-1.48

0.7167

-1.41

0.7146

-1.43

0.6443

-1.85

zip11

0.5098

-2.6

0.5164

-2.55

0.5144

-2.56

0.4656

-2.92

zip12

0.7491

-0.87

0.7531

-0.86

0.7511

-0.86

0.6866

-1.13

zip13

0.7654

-1.12

0.7683

-1.1

0.7643

-1.13

0.6932

-1.52

zip14

0.5751

-1.72

0.5915

-1.63

0.5874

-1.65

0.4973

-2.16

zip15

0.4534

-2.23

0.4617

-2.17

0.4597

-2.18

0.4074

-2.5

zip16

0.8243

-0.79

0.8023

-0.9

0.7949

-0.94

0.7289

-1.28

zip17

0.4974

-2.47

0.5034

-2.43

0.5013

-2.44

0.4335

-2.94

zip18

0.4781

-3.02

0.4777

-3.03

0.4754

-3.05

0.4931

-2.87

zip19

1

zip20

0.9167

-0.23

0.9215

-0.22

0.9168

-0.23

0.8435

-0.45

zip21

0.4493

-2.26

0.4484

-2.26

0.448

-2.27

0.4309

-2.36

zip22

0.443

-3.29

0.4467

-3.26

0.4464

-3.26

0.4458

-3.24

zip23

0.5273

-2.13

0.5265

-2.14

0.5261

-2.15

0.5382

-2.04

zip24

0.598

-1.69

0.6091

-1.63

0.607

-1.64

0.5537

-1.92

zip25

0.5941

-2.08

0.5978

-2.05

0.5943

-2.08

0.5493

-2.37

zip26

0.5892

-2.21

0.5968

-2.16

0.593

-2.18

0.5296

-2.63

zip27

1

zip28

0.4189

-3.01

0.4216

-2.99

0.4212

-2.99

0.3863

-3.26

zip29

0.8131

-0.74

0.8146

-0.73

0.8111

-0.75

0.7646

-0.96

zip30

0.6309

-1.8

0.6178

-1.88

0.6134

-1.91

0.5465

-2.34

1

1

1

1

1
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zip31

0.8173

-0.63

0.844

-0.52

0.8446

-0.52

0.7244

-1

zip32

0.9152

-0.34

0.9022

-0.4

0.8967

-0.42

0.7668

-1.02

zip33

0.4276

-3.01

0.4257

-3.02

0.4227

-3.04

0.361

-3.58

zip34

0.6779

-1.22

0.6757

-1.23

0.6729

-1.24

0.6007

-1.58

zip35

0.573

-1.87

0.5691

-1.9

0.5663

-1.91

0.499

-2.31

zip36

0.751

-1.11

0.7585

-1.07

0.7539

-1.09

0.6775

-1.49

zip37

0.6802

-1.61

0.6805

-1.61

0.6775

-1.63

0.5993

-2.12

zip38

0.8484

-0.41

0.8433

-0.43

0.8351

-0.45

0.7344

-0.77

zip39

0.565

-2.27

0.5669

-2.25

0.5643

-2.27

0.5015

-2.71

zip40

0.5493

-2.23

0.5572

-2.17

0.553

-2.2

0.515

-2.44

zip41

0.7061

-1.1

0.6957

-1.15

0.6932

-1.16

0.6066

-1.56

zip42

0.0621

-1.76

0.0718

-1.62

0.0698

-1.64

0.0589

-1.79

zip43

0.7577

-0.69

0.7544

-0.7

0.7492

-0.72

0.6299

-1.15

zip44

0.5232

-2.23

0.517

-2.27

0.5136

-2.29

0.453

-2.7

zip45

0.5606

-1.18

0.5611

-1.17

0.5635

-1.16

0.489

-1.45

zip46

0.5684

-1.68

0.5797

-1.62

0.5732

-1.65

0.5422

-1.81

zip47

0.4008

-3.51

0.4005

-3.51

0.3995

-3.52

0.3822

-3.67

zip48

0.5559

-1.95

0.5697

-1.87

0.5685

-1.88

0.5276

-2.1

zip49

1

zip50

0.489

zip51

1

1
-2.75

1

0.4882
1

-2.76

0.4856
1

1
-2.78

0.4499

-3.05

1

Notes: For the logit model (3a) Log likelihood -4369.49; chi2 is 1867.77 and Pseudo R2 .1761, and for each subsequent equation respectively: (3b) Log likelihood -4363.7392; chi2
1885.42 and .1778; (3c) Log likelihood -4360.2604; chi2 1886.23 and Pseudo R2.1778; (3d) Log likelihood -4325.0257; chi2 1956.70 and Pseudo R2.1845
N=14,781 ***, **, *, denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively or p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1
Notes: For the logit model (3a) Log likelihood -4369.49; chi2 is 1867.77 and Pseudo R2 .1761, and for each subsequent equation respectively: (3b) Log likelihood -4363.7392; chi2
1885.42 and .1778; (3c) Log likelihood -4360.2604; chi2 1886.23 and Pseudo R2.1778; (3d) Log likelihood -4325.0257; chi2 1956.70 and Pseudo R2.1845
N=14,781 ***, **, *, denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively or p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1
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Homes that use Virtual Views and Premier Pix are significant and positive and increase the
likelihood of selling the home by 1.77 times with Virtual Views and 1.89 with Premier Pix.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION
Summary of the Research Problem
Technological advances continue to pave the way for digital marketing innovations in
real estate, and as buyers are increasingly depending on the Internet, in general as a search tool in
the home buying process, and are more specifically associating the quality of the online listing
with the quality of the home itself. Sellers want to earn the most amount of money on the sale of
their house as they can, and depend on agents to work on their behalf towards that end at the
signing of the listing contract that guarantees the agent a commission upon sale. The expectation
the seller has is that the agent will work in good faith to make the best match with a buyer and
secure the highest sale price in the given marketing duration agreed upon. By hiring an agent,
sellers are putting their trust in the marketing expertise of the agent to market the property
effectively. Yet, despite the preponderance of evidence that buyers are looking online and expect
comprehensive property information and quality visual information and virtual tours, agents still
do not seem to value them even when selling their own homes. In some cases, the pay off for the
agent (anywhere from a 2.5-3% commission once split among real estate professionals
participating in the transaction), who bears most of the cost for marketing the property, is not
worth the expense it takes to provide quality online marketing. Sellers need to be better informed
so they can choose agents whose digital marketing strategies are evinced in their ability and
willingness to provide observable digital marketing efforts and who have demonstrated success
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in securing selling prices close to the asking prices. To date, there has not been any empirical
evidence to indicate which strategies and decisions will increase the sale price, help the home to
sell within a reasonable time frame, and increase the likelihood that it will sell. Knowing whether
opting-in to allow third-party comments in association with online listings as well as whether
having a virtual tour, in general, and even if a particular platform, has a significant impact on
important market outcomes, empowers sellers and can help agents to gain a competitive edge by
determining the best digital marketing strategies to invest in (e.g. choosing to use a virtual tour,
and if so, which specific platform).

Research Questions
Main RQ: What impact do the digital marketing decisions of sellers and agents have on market
outcomes in residential real estate?
RQ1.a. What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the sale price of sold single-family residential
properties?
RQ1.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the sale
price of sold single-family residential properties?

RQ2.a. What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the time-on-the-market of sold single-family
residential properties?
RQ2.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the time-onthe-market of sold single-family residential properties?
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RQ3.a What is the impact of the digital marketing decisions of sellers (third-party
comments) and agents (virtual tours) on the probability that single-family residential
properties will be sold or not sold within a given marketing period?
RQ3.b. What impact does the agent’s choice of virtual tour platform have on the
probability that single-family residential properties will be sold or not sold within a given
marketing period?
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were formulated from three distinct theories (information asymmetry,
information overload, and search theory) and inform H1 H2 and H3 respectively:

H1a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
positive impact on sales price.
H1b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on
sales price.
H1c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on sales price.
H1d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a positive impact on sales price.

H2a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
positive impact on time-on-market.
H2b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on
time-on-market..
H2c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on time-on-market..
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H2d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a positive impact on time-on-market.

H3a: The digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments has a
positive impact on the probability of sale.
H3b: The digital marketing decision of agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on
the probability of sale.
H3c: The combined digital marketing decision of sellers to allow third-party comments
and agents to use virtual tours has a positive impact on the probability of sale.
H3d: The agent’s choice of virtual tour platform has a positive impact on the probability
of sale.

Review of the Methodology
The methodology used in this study is a quantitative analysis using three econometric
models standard in real estate studies to determine if digital marketing decisions of sellers and
agents affects the three market outcomes of sale price (using a Hedonic Pricing Model with
OLS), time-on-market (using a Time-on-Market Model with OLS) and the probability of sale
(using a Logit Model and reporting the Odds Ratio) (Benefield & Hardin, 2015; Johnson,
Benefield, & Wiley, 2007).
Discussion of Findings
To answer the research questions, the econometric models were used to test the
hypotheses that the digital marketing efforts by sellers and agents (as distinct efforts as well as
when combined) would increase the sale price, increase the marketing period, and increase the
likelihood that the property would successfully transact within a given marketing period. The
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empirical findings in this study find a variance in the support of each hypothesis; not all digital
marketing effort scenarios sign as significant or expected. Allowing third-party comments is not
significant in the sale price models; it is only significant and signs negative in 2d of the time-onmarket model when used as a control with the various virtual tour platforms (meaning that it
lessens the marketing span by 3% or approximately 3 days), but it is significant and favorable in
models 3b and 3c indicating that allowing third party comments increases the likelihood of
selling the property. One possible explanation for the decreased marketing time in the model
with third-party comments and specific platforms and for the increased likelihood of sale is that
since the seller has decided to allow third-party comments, there could be favorable comments
on the property or comments expressing interest in the property. This commentary could make
the property more desirable to potential buyers and hasten the arrival rates of buyers who are a
potential match for the seller.
Of those combined digital marketing efforts of allowing third-party comments and using
virtual tours, none of the models for any of the market outcomes show a significant effect; thus,
combining these digital marketing strategies does not have a statistical impact. If using both of
these strategies combined had provided additional information on the property for potential
buyers, there would have been an expected increase in price as well as an increase in the
likelihood of a successful transaction in the given marketing time. In regards to the marketing
time, a trade-off for higher prices would have been an extended marketing time due to the
additional information for the potential purchaser. However, as there is no clear economic gain
or loss for the seller to use this combined marketing strategy, perhaps entertaining the “potential”
negative effects can help inform a seller’s decision. For example, given that buyers expect virtual
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tours and use them to gain additional information, allowing additional commentary could result
in unfavorable remarks associated with the property.
Using a virtual tour, irrespective of platform or quality, as opposed to not having one,
increases the sales price by 3.48 or 3.5% (approximately by $12, 250 based on the average home
price of $350,000), increases the time on the market between 9-10 days, and also increases the
likelihood of selling the property within a given marketing period with an odds ratio of 1.16. For
the seller, the additional profit on the sale has to be leveraged against the additional time (which
may include holding costs as well as paying mortgages on two properties if another home has
already been purchased). Nevertheless, given that the probability of selling increases, and that
most buyers expect a virtual tour, sellers may determine the additional profit to be worth the
trade-off of extended marketing time and associated costs. Although the marketing effort is
clearly advantageous for the seller, agents may not necessarily see the cost benefit (assuming a
3% commission after split) as a virtual tour may only generate an additional $367 in
compensation.
Given that the majority of the properties using the Insta Tour virtual tour platforms were
in the low to mid-list price range and the extremely low cost (only $1.99) and low effort level
(seemingly translating into low quality), it is not altogether surprising that buyers do not ascribe
quality to the property listings with these virtual tours. Insta Tour market properties reveal a
decrease in sale price by approximately $15, 750 when evaluated at an approximate of the $350,
000 mean sale price. While the agent may have “saved” time and costs on the front end in
avoiding marketing efforts and expenses with the automated virtual tour platform service, and
only lost less than $500 out of pocket (the final 3% commission of a home with the sale price of
$350, 000, would go from $10,500 to $10, 027), the seller is the one will lose out on making the
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most monetary gain from the financial investment of the home property. Additionally, using
Insta Tour also increases the time on the market by 7.7%, or approximately close to 8 days.
Given the extended marketing span of a week, it is unsurprising that the probability of sale
decreases when using this virtual tour platform. The other nationally based virtual tour platform,
Virtual Views, does not have a significant impact on the sale price, but there is an extended timeon-market result with 7.9% or between seven and eight days. Using this virtual tour platform
also increases the likelihood that the property will sell.
The higher end virtual tour platform, Premier Pix, which is regionally based and most
often used in the mid-high and high list price ranges significantly increases the sale price by
approximately $26, 250. Even with the highest “elite” virtual tour package cost of $650, the
expense seems more than worth it for the seller. However, with an agent compensation increase
of about roughly $700, the slight increase in commission may not motivate an agent to incur the
additional marketing expense. Still, this high-quality virtual tour could result in the overall
service quality perception of high-end sellers (who may own multiple properties) and buyers
with higher-income social circles and professional networks who would most likely hear of the
agent’s high quality marketing efforts and success.
YouTube also has an increase in price of an estimated 5.75% or approximately $20, 300.
Given that YouTube is a globally known platform owned by Google and connected to its search
algorithms, perhaps the price increase could be a result of the added search engine optimization
(SEO) technologies and popularity of the parent company helping to increase marketing
exposure. While the additional agent earnings are about $600, the Google-related search
exposure through YouTube use may be a pay off in itself.
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In the marketing time span models, the results are also expected, for while
comprehensive information and visuals are associated with higher quality that buyers are willing
to pay for, the sheer amount of information available can impede the timeliness of the decision
making process. With more details available, buyers take longer to “digitally house hunt”; the
combined digital marketing efforts are significant and positive when used as a control with the
specific platforms (indicating an extension of days on the market). However, none that are
significant extend past a two-week mark. For every additional day, the seller incurs additional
holding costs, thus, the extended marketing time to earn the additional profit has to be evaluated
against the costs incurred for the added time.
Premier Pix and YouTube are not significant in the time-on-market regression and using
either of the national third-party marketing companies, Virtual Views or Insta Tour will result in
longer days on the market by about 7 to 8 days. The increase in marketing time span may be
explained according to NAR 2017’s “Digital Report” that records an extension of three weeks
between the 2001 homebuyers who looked for seven weeks for homes compared to the 2016
homebuyers whose search time frame was extended to 10 weeks.
Generally a longer marketing time has an inverse effect on the probability of sale, so
where longer marketing spans occur, one would expect a decreased likelihood of sale.
Premier Pix is the best platform to increase the likelihood of a sale as indicated in the odds ratio
of 1.8. In other words, using this platform increases the likelihood that the property will
successfully transact in a given marketing period followed closely by Virtual Views with an odds
ratio of 1.77. Using the Insta Tour platform in addition not seem to make economical sense for
either sellers or agents as it not only decreases the sale price and takes longer to sell, it also
decreases the likelihood that the property will sell with an odds ratio of .49. In considering
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whether or not the quality of virtual tour platforms matters as an influence on market outcomes,
this research proffers a resounding “yes!” Those with low to mid priced homes (up to $500,000)
may want to be particularly aware that lower quality platforms perform less successfully in all
three market outcomes. Agents and sellers should consider quality of virtual tours over simply
convenience to ensure measurable success of digital marketing efforts in effecting sale price,
time on the market, and likelihood of a sale. While the value (compensation in commission) may
not be significant for the agent, the value for the seller in terms of profitability on the final sale is
significant. Sellers want to make sure that their listing agents are doing their due diligence to
earn their half of the 6% commission by making effective digital marketing decisions on their
behalf.
Contribution to Knowledge and Practice
This study contributes to digital marketing research by addressing questions as to how to
evaluate digital marketing decisions and using quantitative data to investigate the effects of
digital marketing efforts on market outcomes discussed in real estate. It contributes to residential
real estate studies by exploring the digital marketing activities captured in the MLA data fields
and updating the discussions alongside increased technology use and growth in the real estate
industry.
Additionally, this study seeks to contribute to real estate industry knowledge by
providing empirically based evidence to sellers and agents regarding the benefits and costs of
using combined digital marketing efforts as well as how well certain virtual tour platforms
perform. With Zillow and its extensive database assuming an influential role in the real estate
marketplace and discussions questioning the benefits of fixed-rate commission structures for
agents abounding, the real estate industry could be on the cusp of change in certain areas.
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Recently, Wang & Yang (2017) suggest using flexible-rate type contracts that benefits the seller
by having the agent’s commission negotiated depending on selling the property in a certain time
frame at a specified reservation price. While that is one way to ensure honest marketing effort
on behalf of the agent, another way of empowering sellers is through studies like this one that
help to inform them about the effects that digital marketing strategies have on their sale price and
any trade offs that might emerge for the time-on-market as well as the likelihood that they will
have a successful transaction. Such knowledge could assist them in selecting listing agents with
savvy digital marketing skills to market their properties.
Recommendations for Future Research
This work is just the launching point for future empirical investigations of how digital
marketing is impacting residential real estate. First, there are two vanes to be considered under
the DSMM umbrella; as this study primarily focuses on the D for “digital, ” future work can
investigate the remaining SMM - social media and mobile marketing. Second, the research
framework for DSMM adapted from Kannan & Li (2017) can serve to help organize future
research according to the touchpoints. For example, one of the touchpoints is user-generated
content, and as NAR’s 2017 homebuyer survey reveals, current trends in real estate include using
social media and realtor blogs for home searching; future work could consider the impact of
social media use of buyers, sellers, and agents in sharing of property listing information as well
as the seller’s choice to allow an automated valuation model (AVM) to be associated with the
online property listing.
Some may argue that some sellers are highly motivated to sell immediately for a variety
of reasons: new job, moving, marriage, birth, death, etc.; perhaps a future study can determine
what length of marketing time is ideal to certain segments of sellers and in what circumstances.
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This current study could also be replicated for multi-city comparisons across samples. Additional
properties other than single-family homes such as condos and townhouses that are more
homogenous in nature could be considered in a similar study. As suggested by one USF
professor on the doctoral dissertation committee, an experimental study could be designed for
ongoing data collection to gather and monitor data in real time as well as provide data to
supplement that recorded in MLS (e.g. data from Zillow listings).
Another research inquiry could more thoroughly address the issue of virtual tour quality
and provide more in-depth inquiry into virtual tour platform quality as well as virtual tour
quality, in general (under sensory marketing, perhaps, to investigate the choices of musical
genres selected for virtual tours of property listings).
Conclusion
Digital marketing has permeated the real estate industry. With the ever-evolving
innovation of marketing technology and digi-savvy buyers, it is imperative to have empiricallybased evidence to help determine which digital marketing efforts have a favorable impact on
market outcomes, and thus justify the additional expenses and investment for sellers and agents.
This study investigates these digital marketing efforts on an academic level and also has a
pragmatic economic benefit: informing sellers about the effects of their decisions to allow thirdparty comments and determining whether a virtual tour (particularly one that is of good quality)
will affect their end goal of selling their largest financial asset for as close to their asking price as
possible.
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